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Introduction: 
The Problem of Memory 
For the essence of a nation is that all of the individuals have many things in 
common, but also that they have all forgotten many other things. No French 
citizen knows if he is Burgundian, Alain, Taifale, or Visigoth; every French 
citizen must have forgotten the Saint-Barthelemy, the 13th-century massacres 
in the Midi. 1 
Why do we need to remember? What is the motivation behind the 
determination not to forget? Fmihermore, how is our memory shaped and molded to 
fit into our national identity? And what about forgetting? Memory is also a selective 
process because there are things which are forgotten by remembering. I have learned 
something about how cotnmunities remember, especially about how a particularly 
important form of them, the nation state, bind themselves through memory, from 
Ernst Renan's 1882 essay, What is a Nation? He argued that nations are based not 
exclusively on race, religion, geography, or language, but on the fact that the people 
in them, for whatever reason, imagine themselves to be connected to one another. To 
accomplish this, they must both remember and forget. Finally, what does identity in 
the present have to do with remembering? This paper is concerned with one memory 
in particular, that of the Holocaust, and one identity in particular, that of Germany. 
This paper deals with the ongoing memory-work dealing with the Holocaust 
in German speaking lands. I argue that Germany's memory-work, as it relates to the 
Holocaust, is unique by virtue of its status as a perpetrator nation. The Holocaust was 
certainly a turning point in the twentieth century. Mass death of this magnitude 
including men, women, and children, soldiers and civilians, people from all walks of 
1 
life and the world over were touched by WWII. Nothing of this nature had been 
experienced in the modem age. This mass death enable a "democratization of 
memory," tnemory for all. 
Specifically, I will address how remembrance of the Holocaust is shaping the 
memorialization process and in tum how the phenotnenon of public memorialization 
is functioning to shape the national identity of a re-unified German nation. To reveal 
how the latter part of this process worked I will analyze the public discourse which 
suiTounds the building of the national Holocaust memorial in Berlin. One of the 
questions to be addressed will be: How the city of Berlin proposes to house the 
memory of a people no longer at home there and what is going to become the 
"official" state supported history of the Nazi era? James Young aptly describes the 
atmosphere in Germany when it comes to the art of memory as free-floating anxiety.2 
The intent of this paper is to examine the reasons for this anxiety. I will argue that all 
of the angst and seemingly unending deliberations and debates sunounding the 
building of this memorial from its physical design to its intended meaning were not 
just so much hot air. Rather, following Young, I believe that the angst itself may just 
be the greatest tribute to those murdered during the Nazi regime. The very discourse 
itself may be the ultimate memorial. For how better to keep the past alive than 
constant debate? For if the Holocaust were to be consigned to the history books, like 
so many other atrocities, only to be discussed in a half page dialogue, would we 
remain passionate? Would we remain engaged? Germany can never "solve" its ' 
1 Ernst Renan, What is a Nation? (1882). 
2 James E. Young. "Daniel Libeskind 's Jewish Museum in Berlin: The Uncanny Art ofMemorial 
Architecture," (October 30, 1997) in Vorgiinge anliisslich der Verleihung der Ehrendoktmw izrde an 
Daniel Libeskind. 
2 
history or make it more tasteful. The very aesthetics of memorial, the tastefulness, 
gripped the memorial dilemma for some fifteen years. It is obvious that time does not 
heal all wounds. It is my greatest hope that many years from now the same debates, 
coupled with new ones, will still be waged, lest we forget and repeat our past 
transgressions. 
Perhaps Saul Friedlander said it best when he observed that what we should 
strive for is not redemption but quite the opposite "an anti-redemptory history of the 
Holocaust that resists closure, sustains uncertainty, and allows us to live without full 
understanding. "3 The systematic killing of millions of human beings in the most 
modem and civilized century yet is problematic for all of us not just the Germans. 
Mankind can not fully understand the madness of the Holocaust because to 
understand it would mean that we had rationalized and justified it and that simply is 
unacceptable. 
Memory and memorialization are two of the most frequently used terms in 
societal discourse today, especially in light of the events of September 11, 2001. The 
design competition for the World Trade Center Memorial was the largest ever with a 
record 5,201 submissions from 63 nations. The winning design, Reflecting Absence, 
created by architect Michael Arad and landscape architect Peter Walker accomplished 
what many thought might be impossible, to incorporate a memorial into the fabric of 
the city and still make the area usable in an economical sense. The memorial is to be 
encapsulated within a field of trees that is intenupted by two large recessed pools. 
The pools will have ramps that surround them and encompass the footprints of the 
3 Saul Friedlander, Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe. (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1993), 61. 
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twin towers. The pools are symbolic of large voids, open and visible reminders of the 
absence. The memorial grounds will not be isolated from the rest of the city; they will 
be a living part of it.4 The design has drawn both criticism and accolades and asks the 
question: what ultimate purpose do memory and memorialization to serve? 
To whom do memorials speak: the dead, the living, or future generations? For 
what purpose do we build: to heal, to pacify, to enlighten, or to reflect? Why in 
response to disaster and mass death, is there always such an immediate call for 
monuments and memorials? More importantly what do we mean when we refer to 
public memory or collective remembrance? Answering these questions is important to 
the outcome of this work. To begin to unravel this co1nplex issue I might offer a 
quote by the eminent French historian Pierre Nora who eloquently attested that 
"memory is life, a perpetual bond to the eternal past. "5 Andreas Huyssen echoed this 
sentiment when he declared that "remembrance shapes our links to the past, and the 
ways we remember define us in the present."6 Memory is an integral part of society 
and our identity and much like reason, performs a sociological and ideological 
function. 
The question of memory is almost as difficult to get our arms around as the 
one posed by Edward Carr in the title of his 1961 work, What is History? For both 
memory and history are subjective and subject to moral judgment. Neither are neutral 
4 Information on the NYC memorial to the victims of the World Trade Center terrorist attacks is taken 
from the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation's press release (Wednesday, January 14, 2004) 
"Architect Michael Arad and Landscape Architect Peter Walker Unveil Winning Design for World 
Trade Center Site Memorial: Reflecting Absence" from www.WTCSiteMemorial.org 
5 Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire," Representations, Volume 0, 
Issue 26 (Spring, 1989), 7-24. 
6 Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia. (New York: 
Routledge, 1995), 249. 
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let alone inherently good. Neither are mutually exclusive. "Memory is life," claimed 
Pierre Nora, 
"It remains 1n permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and 
forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations. Vulnerable to manipulation 
and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived."7 
However vague memory is, however it may be socially constructed, it is always about 
past experience and therefore its "pastness" is subject to interpretation. Memory is 
real, "a perpetual actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present. "8 
However, all memories are different, all social constructs of it are different, and 
therefore all interpretations of the meaning of the past will be different. Once 
something is remembered then comes the slippery slope of determining precisely how 
that memory should be remembered so that it's the san1e for an entire population ... or 
is that out of the realm of imagination, for after all "memory is blind to all but the 
group it binds. "9 
There are as many varied memories as there are groups. Just as there are no 
two identical snowflakes there are no two identical memories. For the individual and 
the collective memory is abstract, subjective, and above all, fluid. "Memory is 
certainly very much in fashion these days," Arno Mayer asserts in the opening of his 
essay, Memory and History: On the Poverty of Remembering and Forgetting the 
Judeocide, "in Caen, in Jerusalem, in Washington, in Moscow, in Warsaw, in Berlin, 
7 Nora, 8. 
8 Ibid. , 8. 
9 Ibid. , 9. 
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in Oradour, on Goree Island." 10 Across the globe memory is being packaged and sold 
for profit and political ends. The Germans have even developed a term to describe 
this phenomenon, Erinnerungspolitik, which translates to "memory politics." Rudy 
Koshar, in "Building Pasts," singles out historical preservation as being the one 
recurring theme in cultural politics of the past two centuries. 11 "Cultural politics," by 
definition, explores precisely what is cultural about politics and what is political 
about culture. Furthermore, cultural politics emphasizes how cultural theories and 
practices intersect with and elucidate analyses of political power. 12 
Pierre Nora developed the term, lieux de memo ire, (sites of memory) in order 
to try and explain why and how monuments and other landmarks had become so 
important in group memory formation in the twentieth century - the century of total 
war. In German-speaking lands this phenomenon is referred to as the "cult of 
monuments," 13 due in part to the enormous number of monuments, memorials, 
plaques, museums, etc. that have virtually transformed the physical landscape since 
WWI. One possible cause for this "cult of monument" is the phenomenon of 
industrialized mass deaths which have occurred in the twentieth century. 
When considering tnemory one will undoubtedly run across discussions about 
public, or, collective memory. Public memory differs from individualtnen1ory in that 
public memory is negotiated by society's beliefs and values, rituals and institutions. 14 
10 Arno Mayer, "Memory and History: On the Poverty of Remembering and Forgetting the Judeocide," 
Radical History Review 56:5-20, 1993. 
11 Rudy Koshar, "Building Pasts: Historic Preservation and Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany," 
in Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, John R. Gillis ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 215 . 
12 This definition of cultural politics comes from the Cultural Politics Journal, published by 
Northumberland University. 
13 Koshar, 215. 
14 Huyssen, 249. 
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• 
The modem ongtns of the work on sociaVpublic memory began with Maurice 
Halbwachs in his 1925 les Cadres sociaux de Ia Memoire and La memoire collective 
(1950). Halbwachs argued that it was through membership in a social group, 
particularly through kinship, religion, and class affiliations, that individuals were able 
to acquire, to localize, and to recall their memories. A framework for public memory 
must be constructed and this construction is often times arduous and riddled with 
conflict. Present meaning must be assigned to past events, his is done through a 
"socially active" process. 
Since the end of WWII the catastrophe of the mass murder of European Jewry 
has not been successfully incorporated into a compelling framework of meaning in 
the public consciousness. 15 There is a limit to how we can articulate the Holocaust. It 
resists closure. Therefore, the likelihood of different collective 1nemories coming into 
competition is vast, even inherent to the process of collective remembrance. Like 
individual memory, collective memory is never permanent and is subject to constant 
mitigation and reconstruction. With so many competing memories the vantage point 
in which a society will choose to view its past is extremely difficult. What memories 
a society chooses to highlight and forget is the crux of their identity. 
Jay Winter, in his work Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in 
European Cultural History, argues that to an extent there has been an epistemological 
break in the twentieth century associated with the Holocaust. He argues that it might 
not also be linked to atrocities and episodes of mass death that preceded the 
Holocaust (such as the genocide of the Armenians in 1911 and Stalin's murder of 
15 Saul Friedlander in Michael L. Morgan, ed. A Holocaust Reader: Responses to the Nazi 
Extermination , (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) , 276-277. 
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millions by famine in the 193 Os and the mass death in the trenches 1914 - 1918) and 
to such post- 1945 horrors as the depredations in Cambodia and recent atrocities in 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia? Can we compare responses to the horrors of war 
to responses to the horrors of genocide? For while the Holocaust and other episodes 
of mass death may, in their scale, make a mockery of the traditional vocabularies and 
rituals of consolidation (sacrifice, redemption, triumph over adversity, dying so that 
others may live), old-fashioned language persisted in the remembrance of the 
combatants of the Second World War if not the victims of Hitler's racial 
exterminations and civilians wiped out in massive bombings. 16 For with the 
conclusion of WWI remembrance of the common soldier made a huge progressive 
leap. So too with this "democratization of memory" 17 crune the radical revolution in 
public memory. Such a drastic change that it concerns us still today with the building 
of the Berlin Holocaust Memorial. Mass death enabled this democratization of 
memory because it touched so many lives on so many varied levels. The twentieth 
century was without doubt a turning point. 
Memorialization has become a field of study in itself. Among those leading 
this research is Geoffrey Hartmru1. In his work, Holocaust Remembrance: The Shapes 
of Memory, Hartman primarily concerns himself with discussing what, if anything, 
will be gained by remembering the Holocaust. Hartman sees the most utility in 
remembering for those who survived or lived the nightmare, but he questions what 
good the avalanche of new material: films, novels, historical preservation, witness 
16 Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
17 Thomas W. Laqueur, "Memory and Naming in the Great War," in Commemorations: The Politics of 
National Identity. 
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accounts, and perhaps the biggest affront to memory, monuments, can possibly do for 
generations so far removed from the actual event. When describing what memory is 
Hartman succinctly describes it as the "residue left in the mind by the ruins of time, 
and capable of retrieving and even restoring the past." 18 For Hartman memory is a 
powerful tool capable of bringing back an event lost in time to prominent position 
within ones mind. 
Another scholar who has devoted an immense amount of time to the study of 
Holocaust remembrance is James E. Young. In his seminal work, The Texture of 
Memory, Young is concerned not only with the idea of the monument, what 
significance it holds for people, but he also delves into a much more volatile arena 
when he explores what role monuments play in public memory. By exploring how 
Holocaust monuments and memorials work in Germany, where the idea of mass 
destruction was born, Poland, where the majority of the atrocities were carried out, 
Israel, the nation born of the destruction, and the United States, a country far removed 
from the European arena yet home to thousands of Jewish refugees, Young is able 
demonstrate how the Holocaust era is remembered differently according to each 
nation's own traditions. For Young memory isn't shaped in a vacuum and he argues 
that the motives of memory are never pure. 19 He also points out that "memory is 
never seamless, but always a montage of collected fragments, recomposed by each 
18 Geoffrey H. Hartman ed. Holocaust Remembrance: The Shapes of Memory, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Blackwell, 1994), 1. 
19 James Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning, (New Haven, NJ: Yale 
University Press, 1993). 
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person and generation."20 Memory, according to Young, is constantly changing as it 
"shapes our links to the past, and defines us in the present. "21 
What exactly is it that monuments and memorials do for people or societies? 
A clarification on the terms monument and memorial is appropriate as this time. In 
1986 Arthur Danto, writing for The Nation, tackled this quandary with regards to the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial. He wrote, 
we erect monuments so that we shall always remember and build 
memorials so that we shall never forget. Thus, we have the 
Washington Monument but the Lincoln Memorial. Monuments 
commemorate the memorable and etnbody the tnyths of beginnings. 
Memorials ritualize remembrance and mark the reality of 
ends ... Monuments make heroes and triumphs, victories and conquests, 
perpetually present and part of life. The memorial is a special precinct, 
extruded from life, a segregated enclave where we honor the dead. 
With monuments, we honor ourselves. 22 
These definitions of what monuments and memorials seem to answer our question, 
but James E. Young offers us another explanation one which seems to fit better with 
the current discussion on the Berlin Holocaust Memorial. Young states that 
memorials can be either mournful or celebratory, citing memorial books, memorial 
days, festivals and comtnemorations. Monuments on the other hand are the plastic 
material objects, sculptures, and installations used to symbolize a person, thing, or 
event. Young argues that a memorial can be a place or thing, but it need not be a 
monument, whereas a monument is always a kind of tnemorial. The memorial under 
consideration in this work is the proposed Berlin Holocaust Memorial to 
commemorate the six million Jews murdered by the Nazi regime. 
20 James Young, "Jewish Memory in Poland," in Holocaust Remembrance: The Shapes of Memory. 
Geoffrey Harman ed., 215. 
21 Andreas Huyssen, "Monument and Memory in a Postmodem Age," The Yale Journal of Criticism, 
Volume 6, Number 2, 1993. 
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Germany is plagued with a set of quandaries, perhaps unique, in building this 
memorial: How does a state incorporate shame into its national memorial landscape? 
How does a state remember it's barbarity? How does a state re-enact, commemorate, 
and weave into the fabric of its existence, and identity a crime of such enormity? 
Unlike other state sponsored memorials which are built by victimized nations and 
peoples to themselves in Israel, Poland, or Holland those built in Germany are by 
former perpetrators remembering their victims. Ultimately the Jewish question within 
Germany becomes the memorial question: How does a former persecutor remember 
its victims? This paper deals with a monument of shame, not of honor; a monument 
that does not celebrate anything. How can such a memorial be built? Once built 
would it only reinforce the act of forgetting? There are four other nations, Poland, 
Austria, the United States, and Israel that have grappled with the dilemma of how to 
properly memorialize the Holocaust, however each came at the problem from a very 
different perspective. 
Poland played a unique role during the Holocaust. Officially it could be 
described as the killing fields of the final solution, as six of the death camps were 
housed within its borders. Poland was "the East," the very mention of that struck Jews 
with a sense of terror. Today Poland houses more Jewish memorials than any other 
country in Europe, nearly 2,100.23 Is this then their penance, a ubiquitous montage of 
tombstone-fragment monuments? It appears so. James Young, who has written 
extensively on Polish Holocaust memorials, describes the Polish landscape as one 
dotted with shattered matzevoth, traditional Jewish gravestones, where twin memorial 
22 Arthur Danto, "The Vietnam Veterans Memorial," The Nation, (August 31, 1986). 
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motifs of absence and brokenness emerge. Jewish civilization in Poland can only be 
remembered, as it does not exist today. Once home to a thriving Jewish population of 
nearly three million only the hollow shell remains, a meager five thousand Jews. 
Fragments of shattered Jewish tombstones have become the predominant form of 
public memory. These fragments, once pieced together into a monument, remain 
broken yet are collected into an order, but retain the power to communicate to the 
observer a sense of disorder.24 Young states that these memorials suggest that neither 
past worlds nor memory of them can be made whole again and that they will forever 
convey a void. In Polish memory-work it is the remnants of what once was whole that 
does more for the human psyche than a single monument ever could. 
These "tombstone monuments" embody Holocaust memory, and they did so 
even as Soviet despots attempted to eradicate all reference to Jews from their 
memorials. During the Cold War monuments and memorials to Holocaust victims in 
the Eastern Block almost entirely erased the Jew. Instead of remembering the horror 
perpetrated on the Jew the Communists, in order to legitimate Soviet rule, chose to 
highlight the political prisoners and always highlighted the enemy as the fascist 
infidel and the "victims of fascism." With the fall of the Communism memorial-work 
in Poland experienced a renaissance. As mentioned before Poland contains more 
Holocaust memorials than any other European nation. It's odd that a nation bereft of 
Jews would have so many memorials, one must be reminded that memories' purpose 
is never pure. The Polish government knows that with memorials come tourists, 
however there is something else at work here as well. When thoughts of WWII arise 
23 James Young, "Jewish Memory in Poland," in Holocaust Remembrance: The Shapes of Memmy, 
229. 
12 
Poland would like to retain the role of victim on the world-stage. One way to 
maintain this status of innocence is via incorporation of Polish Jewry into the national 
heritage. It makes it very easy for Poles to cry "Look, Hitler went after us first. .. he 
wanted to eradicate the Pole too!" By equating the genocide of the Jew with that of 
the Pole, Poland in general can somehow absolve themselves of any responsibility. 
In 2000 Austria witnessed the completion of its national metnorial to 
Holocaust victims. The monument was the culmination of a four year introspective 
journey whereby Austrians were presented with their troubled past and charged with 
finding a way to incorporate it into their national history. Is was built in the capital 
city of Vienna in a small picturesque square in the midst of the Judenplatz, on the site 
of a former synagogue burned during a 1421 pogrom, wherein several hundred Jews 
burned themselves inside rather than submit to baptism or execution. A sixteenth-
century plaque still hangs in the square commemorating the death of "Hebrew 
dogs."25 
Like the Berlin memorial the one constructed in Vienna met with similar 
controversy, national embarrassment, and a delay of construction for years while 
dissidents and organizers alike debated its ultimate meaning and shape. As with the 
monument in Berlin a competition was held with nine artists and architects from 
Europe and the United States invited to compete for the design of the memorial. And 
as with the situation in Berlin the questions began to arise in Vienna: Who was the 
monument for? Was it for Jews as a site of mourning? Was it for non-Jewish 
Austrians as an expression of shame for past misgivings? 
24 Ibid. , 216. 
25 Michael Kimmelman, "Behind Sealed Doors, Opening Up the Past," NY Times, October 30, 2000. 
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Designed by British artist, Rachel Whiteread, the memorial stands as a 
testament of what was and what will be no more. The work is meant to resemble an 
inside-out library. The outside of the monument is eggshell in color with minimal 
flourish except for two double doors on the front that entice the observer to try them 
while remaining staunchly closed. The inside contains rows of identical books on 
shelves, spines facing inward. The names of Nazi death camps are inscribed around 
the base. Michael Kimmelman, writing for the NY Times, says that the symbolism is 
obvious clear. "The room cannot be entered ... We will never know what is in the 
books or their names. They are forever lost to us," just as a thousand year old 
civilization was. 26 Kimmelman goes on to say that it's a sculpture about public 
conscience flipped on its head. In her design Whiteread n1akes public what many 
Austrians would like to keep shut away behind closed doors ... their involvement in 
the killing of 65,000 Austrian Jews. The monument suggests that Austrians confront 
the void that they had created in their society and reconcile their Nazi past. 27 
The United States, though far removed frmn the "topography of terror," has 
had its own battles over Holocaust remembrance.28 It appears to the casual observer 
that within the charter of every city in the U.S. a provision is made for some form of 
Holocaust monument to be constructed, dedicated, and forgotten in the confines of a 
small public park. In today's throwaway society, especially American culture, 
memorials are built to serve a purpose, political or social, yet fail to ignite any inner 
reflection that carries on beyond the boundaries of the park in which the visitor has 
26 Ibid. 
27 On Austrian guilt see Judith Miller's One, by One, by One: Facing the Holocaust, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1990). 
28 Young, Holocaust Memorials and Meaning, 283. 
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just trod. What is especially odd is that the Holocaust and WWII did not occur on 
American soil. So instead of having memorials anchored at the actual sites of 
destruction, as is the case in Europe, American monuments to the Holocaust are 
constructed on ideals. 29 American tnemorials are abstract and cannot begin to convey 
the same intensity of emotion as say the memorial and museum at Dachau. James 
Young suggests that American memorials must gesture abstractly to a past removed 
in both time and space and call attention to the vast distance between themselves and 
the destruction. 30 Whereas memorials in Germany and Poland composed of camp 
ruins can transport the visitor back to the actual experience, architects in America 
have to recreate this feeling as much as possible and attempt to reduce the distance 
between Europe and the American audience. 
Peter Novick, professor of history at the University of Chicago, takes up this 
very question: Why the Holocaust has come to take such a prominent role in America 
life? In his work The Holocaust in American Life, Novick argues that American Jews 
have placed the Holocaust at the core of their sense of what it means to be Jewish. 31 
He posits that Holocaust consciousness in America is a construct, chosen to prop up a 
weakening American Jewish identity and garner political and economic support 
among American Jews for what is perceived to be a perpetually threatened Israel. The 
U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum is the "principle symbol and 'address' of 
American Jewry, our 'epistle to the gentiles' about what it means to be Jewish."32 In 
Boston, the New England Holocaust Memorial is located on the Freedom Trail, along 
29 Ibid. , 284. 
30 Ibid., 283-284. 
31 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999). 
32 Ibid. , 204. 
15 
with Paul Revere's house and the Bunker Hill Monument. Novick tells us that all of 
this and more is due to the fact that Jews play an important and influential role in 
Hollywood, the television industry, and the newspaper, magazine, and book 
publishing worlds. 33 
Perhaps the greatest spectacle in American Holocaust remembrance and the 
one which has clearly defined the Holocaust in American memory and history is the 
United States Holocaust Museum located on the mall in Washington D.C. As with 
memorials in Poland, Austria and Germany the construction of this museum caused 
controversy and upheaval. Originally proposed by President Jimmy Carter to "make 
Holocaust memory part of the official legacy of the American experience, "34 the 
White House believed that the creation of a national Holocaust memorial would serve 
both as an act of reconciliation between itself and the Jewish colUlnunity and as an 
appropriate memorial for the victims of the Holocaust. However, the memorial 
quickly became embroiled in a national debate, for if this was to be a national 
memorial, as opposed to a monument erected in a town or city, it had to encompass 
national sentiment, that of a democratic nation of equality and opportunity for all. 
Bitter controversy over site, design, meaning, and political gain belated the 
completion of this project nearly fifteen years. 
No investigation into Holocaust remembrance would be complete without 
considering the case of Israel, for after all, the nation of Israel was created out of the 
33 For discussions of the phenomenon, see Stephen J. Whitfield, American Space, Jewish Time 
(Hamden, Conn.: Archon Book, 1988), chap. 7; J.J. Goldberg, Jewish Power: Inside the American 
Jewish Establishment (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1996), chap.11. 
34 Edward T. Linenthal, Presen,ing Mem01y: The Struggle to Create America 's Holocaust Museum , 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 12-13. 
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ashes of the Holocaust and is sustained by memory of those lost. "The one suitable 
monument to the memory of European Jewry .. .is the State of Israel. .. "35 
The physical act of remembering is a reoccurring theme in Judaism. Memory 
of historical events and the narratives which deliver these memories is central to the 
Jewish faith, tradition, and identity.36 In fact Holocaust memorial culture was meant 
to be an integral part of the secular national symbolism of the Zionist movement and 
the State of Israel.37 Young asserts that memory may be Israel's greatest natural 
resource: memory preserved, restored, and codified. Israelis have defined themselves 
as a people through "commemorative recitations" of their past and they now depend 
on memory for their very existence as a nation. 
As with memorial work in other lands the work of remembrance in Israel is 
also met with conflict and each proposed project generates its share of debate. James 
Young states that "the official approach to Holocaust memory in Israel has long been 
tom between the simultaneous need to remember and to forget, between the early 
founders' enormous state-building task and the reasons why such a state was 
necessary, between the survivors' metnory of victims and the fighters' tnemory of 
resistance. "38 This conflict between martyrs or those who were victims of the 
Holocaust and the freedom fighters is perhaps the most amplified argument and the 
one that has dominated the memorial landscape of Israel. On the one hand there is the 
exiled Jew, the victim who was forced to flee Europe in the Diaspora, or went 
35 Quoted in James Young, Holocaust Memorials and Meaning, 209. 
36 Ibid., 209. 
37 Tom Segev. The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust, Haim Watzman, trans. , (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 427. 
38 Young, Holocaust Memorials and Meaning, 211. 
38 Ibid. , 212. 
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docilely into the gas chambers. On the other had is the Israelis freedom fighter who is 
shrouded in the ideals of the nation, who has fought against the infidel to preserve his 
nation and Jewish way of life. One image of national identity is characterized by 
defeat and victimization, the other as an aggressive warrior defending a nation. These 
two conflicting images have, after years of controversy, been equally melded into the 
fabric of Israel's memory and identity. It has been accomplished ''by ubiquitous 
twinning of martyrs and heroes in Israel's memorial iconography. "39 The victims are 
primarily remembered for demonstrating the necessity for Jews to have a nation of 
their own and a warrior ethos to defend it. In so doing the memorial message 
throughout Israel is easily discerned: as destruction of the martyrs is redeemed by 
those who fought, the Shoah itself is redeemed by the founding of the state.40 
Holocaust memory in Israel differs from other nations in one way. Whereas 
nations such as Germany or Poland remember only the annihilation of the Jew and 
neglect to show the history of Jewish life in Europe, memorials in Israel locate the 
Holocaust in a "historical continuum" that includes Jewish life before and after the 
destruction. In Israel the Jew is celebrated for who they are and what they have 
accomplished and added to the human cultural family. Whereas in other nations the 
Jews are simply remembered for the six million lost in WWII, Israel's national 
Holocaust memorial, Y ad Vashem, embodies all of the symbolism to satisfy both the 
exiled Jew and the Israelis. It stands as a testament to Jewish culture and faith and is 
successfully tnarks the end of Jewish life in exile. James Young summed Israel's 
memorial culture best: "In all cases, the Holocaust is integrated into a long view of 
39 Ibid., 213. 
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1 ewish history: it may be a turning point, a confirmation of Zionist ideology, but it is 
linked nevertheless to a millennium of 1 ewish life in Europe before the war and to 
1 ewish national rebirth afterwards. "41 
The forthcoming chapters will highlight the memory-work that has occupied 
Germany since 1945. Chapter one will highlight how Germans have attempted to 
incorporate the crimes committed by the Third Reich within their nation's fabric over 
the course of the last five decades. Neatly packaged into decades one will begin to see 
how perhaps it wasn't until the close of the twentieth century that Germans were 
really able to confront their past in any usable way. In chapter two the differences in 
memory that developed between East Germany and West Germany will be discussed. 
The East, as part of the Soviet bloc, lost their 1 ews when it came to Holocaust 
memory. Whereas in West Germany, the Holocaust issue was shuffled and reworked 
between the dual emotions of forgetting and remembering so much that I will argue 
any real confrontation with their past was not to happen until post-unification. In 
chapter three the Berlin Holocaust Memorial is introduced. It is here that I will 
discuss the initiative behind the need for the memorial, the iinportance of the location 
of the planned memorial, and finally I will begin to unravel the varying arguments 
surrounding the aesthetics of the memorial. In the final portion of this paper I will 
discuss the monument itself, the two competitions involved in choosing the memorial, 
and the debate that the entire idea generated. 
It should be evident at this point that other nations too have had to undergo 
great pains to complete their Holocaust memorials, monument, and museums as well. 
41 Ibid. , 216. 
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Why is the situation in Berlin so unique? The most obvious answer is that Germany is 
the land which perpetrated the Final Solution. It would seem at this juncture that the 
Germans would simply want to build the memorial and move on. However, this is not 
the case entirely. With the resurgence of Neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic activities in 
Germany, and the world alike, we need to be on our toes to quell the voice of racism 
and hatred. Germany is setting a precedent for they are doing what no nation has done 
before they are atoning, remembering, and reflecting on a genocide committed on 
their soil by their hands. 
So Germany is unique. It has taken almost fifty years of variegated historical 
themes and movements to get them to this point: a national memorial of shame, guilt, 
and grief. No one in western civilization has had to do what Germany is attempting to 
do. Germany is setting a president as a perpetrator nation. The United States does not 
have a comparable memorial for slavery. Yes Germany is constructing this memorial 
for the world at large however that comes in second to the mastering or reconciliation 
of itself to the crime. By building this memorial Germany is making its memory of 
the Holocaust active for however long that may be. They are engaging with it and 
confronting it head on. 
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I 
Politicians, History, and Memory 
To rementber is human, we could even say that it is the essence of humanity. 
- Gyorgy Konrad 1 
Within the past twenty years the Holocaust has taken an unprecedented leap 
into the consciousness of the entire world. The Holocaust is receiving more attention 
in the new millennium than it ever has before and not just by historians. The public 
has developed a fascination with the Nazi era and contributes millions of dollars in 
revenue each year to what many have termed "Shoah business." Why do we mourn 
Hitler's victims more so than some other genocides? Victims of Stalinisn1, Maoism, 
colonialism, Serbia, Ruwanda and Burundi? The answer is that the Holocaust seems 
to carry a message about the twentieth century that concerns not only Jews but all of 
mankind. "The lessons of the Holocaust," are taught in any history 101 lecture hall. 2 
It is perplexing that, while other wars and atrocities eventually lose their 
power to dominate public discussion, the Holocaust has not. It refused to be labeled 
or neatly categorized. It is too massive to be forgotten and too repellant to be 
incorporated into the "normal" narrative of memory. The image of the Holocaust 
1 Gyorgy Konrad, "Abschied von der Chimare: Zwn Streit urn das Holocaust- Denkmal" Der Spiegel 
(April 17, 1995), 222. 
2 There are many scholars who trace the course of German history since the Nazi era. See Geoffrey H. 
Harman, ed., Holocaust Remembrance: The Shapes of Mem01y (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1994), Saul Friedlander, Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), Mary Fulbrook, German National Identity After 
the Holocaust (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1999), Geoff Eley, The "Goldhagen Effect": 
History, Memory, Nazism - Facing the German Past (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan 
Press, 2000), and Peter Novick's The Holocaust in American Life (New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1999) for a detailed discussion of the obsession of the Holocaust at the close of the 
twentieth century. 
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persists in our hearts and minds. We seem trapped, between remembrance and 
forgetting. 
We stand at the beginning of a new century and the city of Berlin is building a 
Holocaust memorial. This stands out as a bit odd since the Holocaust ended 57 years 
ago. Why are the Germans just now getting around to constructing a memorial to the 
millions who died? Yet to those who have followed the tortured case of German 
Holocaust remembrance it doesn't seem odd at all. In fact it seems quite natural and 
fits in perfectly with the evolution of German Holocaust remembrance. 
Locating the appropriate place of the Third Reich within the course of German 
history has occupied the mind of many a scholar. Over the past fifty years "historical 
disputes" have framed the way in which Germans have dealt with their past and 
catchy slogans have affixed themselves to each era of remembrance so as to neatly tie 
the whole controversy into neat thematic packages. Holocaust discourse seems to be 
cyclical with recurring debates and periodic outburst almost always initiated by new 
questions concerning the appropriate interpretation and representation of the 
Holocaust. 3 Thus, the course which the Holocaust memory debate within Germany 
has followed has not been straight or easily defined. With each passing decade since 
the liberation of Auschwitz in 1945 the Holocaust dialogue and memory-work has 
undergone revision. Much like a chameleon the tone of Holocaust memorial discourse 
has mirrored the social mood of the time. This chapter will trace this changing 
discourse, or series of "Holocaust moments,"4 to use Geoff Eley's phrase, from its 
3 Anson Rabinbach, "The Jewish Question in the German Question," New German Critique 44 
(Spring/Summer 1988), 159-192. 
4 GeoffEley, ed. The "Goldhagen Effect " History, Memory, Nazism - Facing the German Past, (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 94. 
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inception at the close of WWII to the current trends at the dawn of a new century. By 
including an analysis of the divergent approaches to memorial building in each 
decade I hope to illuminate the fact that remembering the Jews has become a 
necessary, though not consistent, act for the rehabilitation of Gennany. I also hope to 
shed some light on the evolution of the collective German national psyche from 1945 
to the present and further set the stage for the current dispute which is the crux of this 
paper, the Berlin Holocaust Memorial. 
1945-1959: How Does One Remember What They Refuse to Admit? 
How does one remember what one didn't experience? This is the Holocaust 
memorial quandary in contemporary society, but it was not the question that plagued 
those in the immediate post-war culture. Theirs was not a problem of remembering 
the events but rather one of confession. Germans were quick to deny events and 
construct coping mechanisms to minimize guilt and responsibility, however Geoff 
Eley points out that this tnechanism must be distinguished from "forgetting. " 5 The 
events of the Holocaust were by no means forgotten during this time period, rather 
many have argued that memories were repressed in order that the two new Germanys 
and Israel could be constructed. Alf Ludtke has said that in the 1950s and early 1960s 
the majority of West Germans colluded in "forgetting if not repressing those 
recollections of fascism that might recall its violent and murderous practices. Above 
5 Ibid. , 94. 
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all, one's own role and activity during fascism was "forgotten" or "cut out": people 
silently erased any remembrance of their own acceptance, support, and complicity. "6 
Ursula Hegi's novel, Stones from the River, tackles this very question in post-
war German society. 7 The novel begins in 1918 and follows the life of a Zwerg, 
dwarf, woman living in Burgdorf, Germany and captures the "ordinary Germans" 
response to the events which transpired during WWII. Hegi does and extraordinary 
job of demonstrating the confusing of emotions which ensued in post-1945 Germany. 
Those ordinary Germans who were loyal to the Fuhrer during the war were quickly 
deemed "castoffs" at the conclusion of hostilities. Daily, people wrestled with the 
question of how to come to grips with their new identity in the world community, as 
perpetrators of millions of deaths. Olaf Kuhlke tells the story of a German woman 
who never knew her father, a soldier in the Wehrmacht. 8 She was told he had most 
likely died on the Russian front during the war and was given the official 
classification of "missing," but he had never been declared dead. Upon unification of 
the two Germanys in 1991 and curious about her father's ultimate demise the woman 
applied to see the previously closed Nazi files which were now available for public 
viewing. The woman was prepared for every possible scenario except the one she was 
presented with. In a formal letter she was told that her father spent most of his time 
during the war at Auschwitz, as one of the leading officers responsible for the 
operation of the camp. One can imagine what a blow this would have been. The post-
6 AlfLiidtke, "Coming to Terms with the Past": Illusions of Remembering, Ways of forgetting 
Nazism in West Germany," The Journal of Modern History, Volume 65 , Issue 3 (September 1993), 
554. 
7 Ursula Hegi, Stones From the River, (New York: Poseidon Press, 1994). 
8 OlafKuhlke, "Body, Nation, and Place: The New Berlin Republic and the Spatial Representation of 
German National Identity," Ph.D. Dissertation (Kent State University, 2001). 
24 
war German society was awash with similar stories as this one serving to demonstrate 
what a very confusing and tumultuous time period it was that set the backdrop for the 
hush that descended on Holocaust memory. 
The immediate German response to the events of WWII can be summed up in 
one austere word, silence. Quite simply, there was no interest in the Holocaust. 
Germans were more interested in rebuilding and feeding themselves than in atoning 
for any sins. Besides immediately after the war the "Final Solution" and all that it had 
entailed were not public knowledge. In fact the very term Holocaust hadn't as of yet 
been coined. Why didn't people talk about the largest human tragedy of our time? 
Why was there no interest in the immediate postwar society? Why did some persist in 
denying what had happened in their very town? 
As a small portion of the German intellectual elite began their struggle with 
the Nazi era the majority of the population appeared unable to explore the Nazi past 
in any significant way. A psychoanalytic study spoke of the feeling which seemed to 
grip the nation as an "inability to mourn." Whatever the critics have claimed, this 
voluntary period of silence during reconstruction after 1945, or Trummerzeit, the time 
of ruins, and the economic miracle may have been necessary for the reconstruction of 
German society. 
In an attempt to contextualize this line of reasoning some numbers will be 
helpful. It's estimated that over fifty million soldiers and civilians died during WWII. 
Eleven million of those perished in death camps of those six million were Jews. 
Thirteen million Germans were left homeless at the end of the war amid 400 million 
cubic meters of rubble. One fourth of the country's nineteen million residences were 
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destroyed. The monetary value of Germany's material losses alone were put at 35 
billion Marks. One would have to that the inability to mourn may have had more to 
do with the need to survive than simple denial. Large parts of post-war German 
society also displayed traditional "defense" mechanisms in order to prepare for the 
work of remembering such as anti-Semitism and anti-communism and used slogans 
like "collective guilt theory," and "re-education." Wolfgang Benz also points out that 
many "covered memories" by diverting attention away from German guilt and onto 
Allied "crimes" such as Dresden, Allied war crimes, and the expulsion of Germans 
from Central Europe. 9 Another tactic identified by Benz used to alleviate the 
responsibility of remembrance in the in1mediate post-war society was reference to 
what he called "political fear formulas." Those buying into and using political fear 
formulas called on Germans to be fearful of Soviet imperialism and suspect of 
American economic penetration. A common tactic used by American presidents 
should illuminate this phenomenon. When things are going poorly with domestic 
policy it is often the case that the focus is switched to foreign policy. 
The decade of the 1950's was when the least amount of attention was paid to 
Nazi victims and the most energetic effort to remembering German Victims was 
displayed. Robert Moeller has asserted that the most important representatives of 
German victimhood were the men, women, and children who left or were driven out 
of Eastern Europe by the Red Army at the end of the war and those who ended up in 
captivity in the Soviet Union. 10 This remembering of German victimhood was played 
9 Wolfgang Benz, "Postwar Society and National Socialism: Remembrance, Amnesia, Rejection," Tel 
Aviver Jahrbuch for deutsche Geschichte, Volume 19, 1990, p. 1-12. 
10 Robert G. Moeller, "War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of 
Germany," The American Historical Review, Volume 101, Number 4, (October 1996), 1008. 
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out during denazification proceedings. At the 1945 Potsdam Conference in the 
summer of 1945 the Allies defined the eradication of Nazism from Germany as their 
objective during their occupation, but right from the start each Ally pursued a 
different route to accomplish this. 11 In the first postwar period alone, the Soviets fired 
390,478 former members of the Nazi Party from their jobs. By April 1947, 850,000 
former members of the Party had been examined by 262 denazification commissions. 
Denazification proceeded a bit differently in the western zone. The 
denazification efforts in the western zone quickly turned into a bureaucratic machine 
that produced a lot of paperwork. Especially in the American zone they wanted a 
quick end to the denazification process and preferred a well-functioning economy. 
Therefore, many of the "functional" elites within the zone were left in power so as not 
to disrupt the administration of the country. With that said, in the American zone, for 
example, 3,441,800 people came under suspicion, three-quarters of whotn were 
amnestied or had their cases closed without an indictment. Of 945,000 cases pursued, 
only 10 percent led to an oral hearing. Only 1,654 persons, 0.05 percent of the total, 
were judged to be in "Group I," meaning "major guilt," and 22,122 or 0.6 percent, 
were "burdened." 12 Denazification results confirmed German self-pity and the notions 
of "we the victims" among the majority of Germans. The entire process tended to 
support the idea that most Germans were not responsible for the crimes of the Nazis, 
thus allowing them to perceive themselves as much closer to the victims than the 
perpetrators. 
11 Ludtke, 550. 
12 Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1997), 204. 
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Official hesitation regarding public ceremonies in the 1950's were based on 
the rational that the more public the commemoration the more emotion, and the more 
irrational the activities or voices it may spark. There was widespread fear that a 
backlash of neo-Nazi activity could be sparked from public ceremonies. "Therefore, 
the passivity of political authorities on all levels resonated with manifold desires "to 
forget" while ignoring those who called for enlightened discourse and self-criticism 
by the Germans." Even at the sights of former concentration camps almost nothing 
was done to offer a permanent opportunity to remember Nazi crimes and to construct 
a site for commemoration of the victims. 13 
In the fall of 1959 Theodor W. Adorno gave a public lecture in which he 
addressed the question "What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?'' This 
lecture was important in many ways. Jeffrey Olick has described Adorno's lecture as 
being a classic of critical theory "combining psychoanalytic, philosophical, and 
political concepts to diagnose hidden perils in contemporary social forms." 14 
Adorno's lecture is also an important marker on the historical record. It is situated at a 
moment in history where a growing shift in German political culture was afoot. In 
1959, the lecture was delivered at a turning point between the era of "economic 
miracle" and the "social upheavals" that were to occupy the 1960's. This lecture was 
part of a series of such events as the publication in German of The Diary of Anne 
Frank (1949), the 1958-59 anti-Semitic wave of vandalism, the 1961 Adolf Eichmann 
trial, the construction of the Berlin Wall (1961 ), and the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials 
of 1963-66, that inspired a new generation's challenge to the don't rock the boat 
13 Liidtke, 555. 
14 Olick, "What Does It Mean to Normalize the Past? Official Memory in German Politics Since 
1989 ,"Social Science History 22:4 (Winter 1998). 
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attitude of the early Federal Republic, particularly regarding the memory of the Nazi 
period. 
Adorno's lecture has also been deemed a milestone for it is credited for 
inspiring a new and dramatic direction in Holocaust remembrance in Germany. In 
1959 Adorno called upon intellectuals and ordinary Germans alike to begin the task 
of "working through the past," which detnanded a critical self-evaluation and 
engagement with their past. Adorno claimed that the silence that Germans had been 
living with regarding the Nazi era was not beneficial to the healing of the nation's 
soul. Rather what was needed was a head-on confrontation. He takes the title of his 
lecture, and ultimately its content, from a phrase that was gaining currency as a 
slogan in the 1950's, "coming to terms with the past." For Adorno this phrase posed 
an impending sense of doom. "Coming to terms with the past" did not imply a serious 
working through of the past. Rather it suggested a "turning of the page" and if 
possible wiping it from memory. 
Raul Hilberg, sat very much alone in the 1940's when he began to compile 
information pertaining to the Holocaust era. Hilberg began his groundbreaking text, 
Destruction of the European Jews, in 1948. This work, which has been declared the 
single most important academic text on the Holocaust, was continually rejected by 
publishers until 1961, when a survivor family subsidized the expenses for it to be 
published. Similarly, Saul FriedHinder has observed that German history writing of 
the late forties and fifties had been, in his words, ''uneasy" about Nazism. FriedHinder 
goes on to say that although Nazism was considered an abhorrent calamity in German 
history the worst crimes committed by the Nazis, i.e. those against the Jews, were 
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largely left unexplored. Until the close of the fifties and the publication of Karol 
Dietrich Bracher's work Die Aujlosung der Weimarer Republik, The Dissolution of 
the Weimar Republic (1955). This work inspired a new generation of German 
historians who approached the Third Reich from the perspective of social history. 
Included in this group were historians like Leon Poliakov and Gerald Reidinger. 
These scholars broadened their research into such areas as the social conditions 
behind the rise of Nazism, the role which bureaucracy played, and other various 
structural dynamics which allowed National Socialism to gain momentum. Still, if 
one looks at the Holocaust work going on today, which is methodologically 
diversified and studied from the perspective of multiple disciplines the work going on 
in the 1950's was still very streamlined and gave more of a summary of the events 
without much interpretation. 
This was the overriding mood following the conclusion of WWII, forgive and 
forget and maybe it will go away, except for the small number of researchers who 
were beginning to unravel the period's intricate web of bureaucratic underpinnings. 
This standard of forgive and forget worked for a time, but once the economic miracle 
had drawn to a close and reconstruction was essentially complete the German nation 
was left to evaluate its misgivings. Jeffery Olick has given this period in Gennan 
history, roughly from the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949 through the early 
1960's, the title of "The Reliable Nation." 15 Olick states that Konrad Adenauer' s 
government attempted to resolve the past with institutional reforms. By implementing 
a democratic constitution and legal changes, making reparation payments to Israel, 
15 Jeffrey Olick, "The Sins of Our Fathers: The Third Reich and West German Legitimation, 1949-
1989." Ph.D. Dissertation, (Yale University, 1993). 
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and creating a solid western orientation Adenauer claimed that Germany was a 
rehabilitated sovereign nation which would hold to its promises of democratization 
and repudiate the crimes of the regime. Contrary to this line of thinking, Olaf Kuhlke 
strongly asters that the conservative government of Adenauer and many "ordinary 
Germans" alike continued to disembody, or belittle, the Jewish population as the Nazi 
regime had by trying to ''erase" the Holocaust from national memory, "to silence it 
just like six million Jewish lives had been silenced in the years before." 16 If Getmany 
was, as Olick surmised, the "reliable nation" of the 1950's, or if it continued to 
validate Nazi practices as Kuhlke argues, the 1960's were very different. The German 
nation may have been doing what was morally right in the 1950's or to say, "going 
through the motions." However, there was no real confrontation with the past or the 
past transgressions. The 1960's was when the sons of the perpetrators came of age. 
They entered the universities with an entire different perspective and agenda than 
their fathers and grandfathers. These young men and women identified the gulf which 
existed between making reparations and truly working through the destruction that 
had been visited on a singular group of people. With Adorno's call to Germans to 
work through their past what more befitting title for the decade of the 1960's than the 
"Moral Nation?" 
1960's: The Moral Nation 
The 1960's ushered in an entirely new wave of sentiment. There was a 
rebellion against the silence on the subject of the Holocaust that permeated the 
1950's. If the "fathers" who had lived and fought during the war were left to grapple 
16 Kuhlke, 359. 
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with the Holocaust question in the SO's, then it was their "sons" during the 60 ' s who 
confronted the conspiracy of silence of the previous decade. Accusations were leveled 
against parents, especially for their silence. Memories of German victimization, 
domination the 1950's, were challenged by accounts in which Nazi crimes and the 
victimization of others by Germans were central. The left-wing student movement 
and the Green Party environmental movement culminated in the protests of 1968. 
Among academics there was a new breed of scholar who had experienced 
National Socialism as adolescents and received their academic training after 1945. 
These scholars began a shift in the historiography of National Socialism. This group 
turned the Sonderweg theory on its' head. The Sonderweg explained the peculiar 
route from an authoritarian Kaiserrieich to an authoritarian Third Reich. This new 
breed of radical students, children of the rubble, who had little or no direct experience 
of National Socialism, discovered a new path, one leading from Hitler to Adenauer. 17 
For them it was the capitalist system which had brought fascism to Germany. 18 These 
critical authors focused on suffering perpetrated by Germans onto others and 
explained WWII as a logical outgrowth of National Socialist ideology, not as an 
aberration attributable to Hitler. 19 
The memorial culture began in earnest in the 1960's when the 1961 ttial of SS 
bureaucrat Adolf Eichmann in Israel accelerated confrontation with their 
responsibility. This acknowledgement of guilt was further propelled by the Frankfurt 
17 Moeller, 1034. 
18 For a good introduction to the historiography of National Socialism, see Ian Kershaw, The Nazi 
Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretations, 3d edn. (London, 1993); and Bernard 
Faulenbach, "Emanzipation von der deutschen Tradition? Geschichtsbewusstsein in den sechziger 
Jahren," in Politische Kultur und deutsche Frage: Materialien zum Staats - und Nationalbewusstsein 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Werner Weidenfeld, ed. (Cologne, 1989), 73-92, and Jane Caplan, 
"The Historiography of National Socialism." 
19 Moeller, 1035. 
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Auschwitz trials, and the trials of concentration camp commandants, administrators, 
and employees.2° Claudia Koonz has described the 1960's as a period marked by the 
"recovery of memory."21 She argues that public consciousness in Europe and West 
Germany was jolted by discussions of the Holocaust in periodicals, books, radio, and 
film. Alain Renais's Nuit et Brouillared (1955), the Diary of Anne Frank (1962), Rolf 
Hochhuth's Der Stellvertreter (1963), and Peter Weiss's Die Ermittlung (1964) 
confronted Germans with the question of responsibility for Nazi crimes. Koonz posits 
that Margarete Mitscherlich's article "Inability to Mourn" in 1967 inspired Germans 
to prove her wrong.22 Koonz states that in the 1960's "genocide entered official 
memory."23 This is further evidenced by the year long debate in 1964 over extension 
of the statute of limitations for murder during the Nazi regime. This issue wasn't 
completely settled until July 3, 1979 when parliament decided to abolish any statute 
of limitations for murder?4 Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, in a speech to the Federal 
Parliament, on November 10, 1965, stated that the postwar period was "finished," 
once again hoping to distance themselves from the mass murder committed two 
decades prior.25 
2° For example the investigation of210 men in reserve Police Battalion 101 from Hamburg. See 
Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, 
(New York: Harper Collins, 1992), and Gitta Semey, Into the Darkness: An Examination of 
Conscience (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), 233,251-66. 
21 Claudia Koonz, "Between Memory and Oblivion: Concentration Camps in German Memory," in 
Commemorations. 
22 Alexander Mitscherlich and Margarete Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective 
Behavior, trans. Beverley R. Placzek (New York: Grove Press, 1975). 
23 Koonz, 268. See Eric Santner, Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory and Film in Postvvar Germany 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 70-75, and Anton Kaes, "History and Film: Public Memory in 
the Age of Electronic Dissemination," History and Memory: Studies in Representation of the Past 
(1990): 111-128. 
24 Ludtke, 570. 
25 Ibid. , 570. 
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Mid-1970's-1989: The Normal Nation 
The decade of the 1970's began with a very symbolic event. In December 
1970 German Chancellor Willy Brandt performed a dramatic genuflection at the 
Warsaw Ghetto Memorial. By performing this single act Brandt demonstrated to 
Poland, the Soviet Union, the Jewish community, and the world at large that 
Germany, as a nation, had acknowledged its guilt over the invasion and repression of 
the peoples of Eastern Europe. Brandt's act of contrition at the base of the memorial 
was said to have marked another shift in Holocaust memory-work toward 
"commemoration and repentance."26 Herf argues that memory of Germany's terrible 
past was indispensable for serving West German policy in the present. 27 What they 
could not change they must except and weave into the fabric of their political 
dialogue. 
Triggered by the Speer Memoirs (1970), the notorious "Hitler Wave" of the 
Seventies with its best-selling Hitler biographies such as Harold Deutsch's Hitler and 
His Generals (1974), and Joachim Fest's Hitler (1974), may have signified at the 
popular level more of an ambiguous attraction and possible nostalgia rather than a 
true desire to remember and come to terms with the past. 
The 1970's concluded with yet another monumental event which would serve 
as the impetus for the 1980's "explosion into memory." In 1979 an American 
television miniseries, Holocaust, was broadcast over four consecutive evenings and 
captivated a West German television audience. This media event demonstrated to 
historians just how limited the impact of their work on Nazism had been to this point. 
26 Eley, 101. 
27 Herf, 346. 
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Holocaust has been judged by many to have evoked a turning point in Germany's 
confrontation with their Nazi crimes. Holocaust revolved around the experience of a 
single German family. Ludtke says, "Thus, administrative discrimination and political 
repression were transposed into personal grief and individual struggle."28 For several 
days millions of West Germans suspended the attitude most of them and their 
(grand)parents had pursued before 1945: that ofbystanders. 
The film told the fictitious story of the German-Jewish Weiss family. A record 
20 million German citizens, fifty percent of the adult population of West Germany, 
tuned in to view it. The film did not offer any new information about the Nazi era 
which the German public was not already aware of. What the film did quite simply 
was to reflect the consensus, established by historians of the 1960's, that the 
apparatus of terror and total destruction visited on Europe's Jews was administered by 
the SS, Gestapo, and the SD. It was these groups who were identified as the agents of 
destruction. 
For weeks prior to the airing of the mini-series television networks prepared 
the groundwork for the response that it knew this show would elicit in West 
Germany. Schools were provided with information packages; the network managers 
stirred public debate; and preparatory broadcasts and press previews partially outlined 
the film and its story. Through its' nearly sixteen hours of airtime Holocaust 
accomplished much more than the extensive educational activities in schools and in 
the media had achieved during the previous three decades. It successfully portrayed 
the drama of a single Jewish family and thus the abstract themes of discrimination 
and political repression were transformed into personal grief and individual struggle. 
28 Ludtke, 544. 
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When abstract history is transformed into a personal story, suddenly history becomes 
alive and has the power to evoke strong identification and attachment. For those brief 
hours Germans were called upon to suspend the attitude of bystander which they had 
been raised on and forced to see their accountability. Holocaust caused many for the 
first time to identity with the anxieties, misery, and desperation of those who had 
been made victims by German Nazis. More important to our discussion than the 
storyline of the film may be the controversy it sparked. The audience was provided 
the opportunity after each viewing to phone in an ask questions or offer comments. 
Panels of specialists were provided to answer questions and exchange opinions. Such 
notable scholars as Andreas Hillgruber, and Martin Broszat participated. Thousands 
of questions flooded the panel, which became overwhelmed. The question which 
loomed the largest among the scholars in these phone-ins was: Why had people 
neglected the knowledge that academia had provided on National Socialism? Why 
had they avoided looking it up in the books? How was it possible that "the masses" -
that is, the average German- had "let it happen?" Who shared complicity in and with 
German fascism? Had "we" or, for that matter, "our parents" recognized what 
happened to neighbors as they were publicly mistreated beginning in March 1933? 
Questions of causation and moral judgment troubled thousands of those who phoned 
in. Along with the question and answer potiion a survey was simultaneously done 
which served to gauge the impact of the film in numbers. To further emphasize the 
shift which was occurring in Holocaust memory-work the statement that all adults 
during Nazism "shared at least some guilt" was rated positive by more people after 
they had watched the film (22% up from 16%). Also, when asked if there was a 
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"moral obligation of Germany to pay compensation and restitution," the approving 
votes shot up from 45% before the showing of the film to 54% afterwards.29 
The final event to mark the decade of the 1970's was the 
Verjiihrungsdebatten, extensive debates held within the Bundestag over the extension 
of the statute of limitations for murder during the Nazi era. These occurred at four 
different junctures in time, 1960, 1965, 1969, and the last one occurring in 1979. 
These Verjiihrungsdebatten brought the issue of the Nazi past as well as the 
magnitude of judicial failure of the 1950's to center stage in West German politics. In 
each of these four Verjiihrungsdebatten, the Social Democratic Party led the fight to 
continue prosecuting crimes of the Nazi era.30 On July 3, 1979, after lengthy debate, 
the Bundestag voted 253 to 228 to abolish the statute of limitations on crimes of 
murder and genocide. 31 The outcome of the Verjiihrungsdebatten was important 
because they led to continued prosecutions and, just as importantly I would argue, 
drew public attention to the crimes of the Nazi era. As we have seen in previous 
decades Holocaust memory-work in Germany has always had an "event" or instance 
in which to build itself around. At the close of the 1970's these Verjiihrungsdebatten 
and the airing of the American television docudrama Holocaust were the defining 
moments. Discussion of the Holocaust became more frequent in West German 
political discourse. And as Herf has identified, it was not long before the "emotive 
power of the term 'Holocaust' was put to use in contemporary politics. During the 
29 Ludtke, 543-547 
30 It was estimated that from May 8, 1945, to the mid-1980's Allied and then West German courts 
accused 90,921 persons of participating in war crimes against humanity. Of this number 6,479 persons 
were convicted. Twelve were executed, 160 were sentenced to life in prison, 6,192 received extended 
prison terms, 114 paid fines, and one youth received a warning; 83 ,140 cases were closed without 
convictions owing to fmdings of innocence, non-opening of the proceedings by the court, or the death 
of the accused. See Herf, 335. 
31 For details of this debate within the Bundestag including all of the participants see Herf, 340-342. 
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bitter debates over nuclear weapons the term Holocaust was used in conjunction with 
deployment of American missiles in West Germany and of a "nuclear Auschwitz" to 
refer to a nuclear war between the two superpowers v:hole primary victims would be 
the two Germanys and Europe as a whole. This denial of the uniqueness of the 
Holocaust during the Euromissiles dispute would set the stage for the 
Historikersstreit of 1985-1986.32 
1980's: Normalization as Relativization 
In German remembrance of the Holocaust during the 1980's the catchword 
was "normalization." Thanks to the conservative leadership of Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl the Germany of the eighties wanted and in some ways succeeded in portraying 
itself as a "normal nation," no different than France or Spain, with the same 
problems, highs and lows. The 1980's have been most commonly identified by the 
duel controversies of the Historikersstreit, and what has become known as the 
"Bitburg affair." Saul FriedHinder has said that minor events may take on a major 
symbolic significance. That was to become the fate of the Bitburg debacle and the 
yearlong historian's debate that was waged on the pages of the Franlifurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, and other prominent newspapers. 
The "commemoration culture" that developed in the 1980's was in part due to 
preparations for the fortieth anniversary of the end of WWII in Europe. 33 This 
preparation produced such products as the brochure titled "Germany for the Jewish 
Traveler," put out by the German Tourist Office, and the revaluation of the content 
32 Herf, 349-350. 
33 Koonz, 268 . 
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and meaning of previously built Holocaust memorials. Dozens of German towns and 
cities invited former Jewish residents and their families to return for civic memorials. 
Following the example of Willy Brandt's genuflection at the Warsaw Memorial in 
1970 Ernst von W eizsacker, Bundespriisident, commemorated the German surrender 
in 1945 by admonishing Germans to accept the responsibilities of their past, "look 
truth straight in the eye - without embellishment or distortion."34 Hundreds of 
German towns and cities were inspired to replace their rather vague metnorial phrases 
such as ''No more war" or "To all victims" with inscriptions like "To the memory of 
our Jewish fellow citizens." Koonz argues that things had so changed in German 
culture as it related to the Holocaust that an American president could speak of 
Wehrmacht soldiers as "victims" at Bitburg, but in 1988 when Bundestag President 
Phillip Jenninger made a clumsy attempt to confront anti-Semitism, a storm of protest 
forced his resignation. 35 
The Bitburg affair began as a nominal event but was to occupy the central spot 
in media coverage for more than two months. This "affair" has also been credited for 
planting the seed for the need for a central Holocaust memorial within the country of 
Germany. Bitburg sytnbolized "all the dilemmas of forgetting and remembering, for 
Germany and its victims, for the victorious allies and the vanquished enetny, for those 
who lived through the war and those born after 1945: the second generation and, by 
now, the third. For Germans and Jews, more than anybody else."36 
34 Richard von Weizsacker, "Speeches for Our Time," David Clay Large, German Issues 10 (1992), 
17-30, and Herf, 355. 
35 Elisabeth Domansky, "Kristallnacht, the Holocaust and German Unity: The Meaning of November 9 
as an Anniversary in Germany," History and Memory: Studies in Representation of the Past 4:1 
(Spring/Summer 1992), 60-87. 
36 FriedHinder, "Some German Struggles with Memory," in Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective, 
Geoffrey Hartman ed. , (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 27. 
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The fortieth anniversary of the end of WWII and the liberation of the Nazi 
death camps came about in 1985. Many ceremonies were planned for its 
commemoration but as with all topics related to the Holocaust there were opposing 
views at work. At the heart of the controversy was an American president, Ronald 
Reagan, who felt, as many others did, that Germany had become a bulwark for 
democracy and that the exiled nation deserved to be rehabilitated spiritually. 
Conversely the number of people who had survived the Holocaust was declining 
everyday. The fortieth anniversary marked a time for them to tell their story before it 
was too late. This was an occasion for them to tell the world how they felt about the 
past and present, including things those following the rehabilitation line of reasoning, 
would have liked to see recede into history. President Reagan had hoped that his trip 
would serve to bring a sense that healing had taken place in the once afflicted nation. 
However, when he agreed to visit a German military cemetery in Bitburg where 49 
SS men were· buried it was not a sense of healing that pervaded but rather one of 
disdain. President Reagan made matters worse for himself when he said that young 
German soldiers were just as much victims of the Third Reich as the Jews were - this 
equation, even though inadvertent, struck a cord especially with survivors. 
The Historikerstreit, the historian's battle over the nature of the Nazi past, 
provided the forum in which two distinct schools of historiography confronted one 
another. The argument, called by some the "war of the German historians,"37 was 
born out of the desire by the neo-conservative intellectual right to reduce the burdens 
of the Holocaust in West German national political discourse by questioning its 
37 Volker Berghahn, "The Unmastered and Unmasterable Past," The Journal of Modern History, 
Volume 63 , Issue 3 (September 1991), 546-554. 
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uniqueness.38 This infuriated left-liberal thinkers such as Jiirgen Habermas, who 
viewed this line of thinking as a revisionist attempt to relativize the significance of 
the National Socialist past. Begun quietly in the mid-1970's it escalated into a noisy 
international dispute in 1986 and ended in an uneasy truce. The dispute began when 
Frankfurt social philosopher, Jiirgen Habermas, accused the well-respected German 
historians Ernst Nolte (Free University of Berlin) and Andreas Hillgruber (University 
of Cologne) of having written revisionist histories. Habermas was writing in response 
to an article by Nolte "Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will," the past that will not 
pass away, that appeared in the Franlifurter Allgemeine Zeitung June 6, 1986. The 
debate had very little to do with Nazism and the crimes it perpetrated but rather with 
political and ideological controversy related to the then current German politics. 
History was but a pretext for the political ends it pursued. 
The historian's involved were not arguing over whether or not the Holocaust 
occurred. What concerned those involved was the legitimacy of comparing the 
Holocaust to other episodes of mass destruction in the twentieth century. Could the 
Holocaust be compared to other tragedies or did it have a singularity all its own? 
Habermas leveled his argument against those he called "government historians" who 
attempted to relativise National Socialism and the Holocaust, Schadensabwicklung, in 
38 For a thorough analysis of the Historikerstreit, see Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988). For the documents see Forever in the Shadow of 
Hitler? The Dispute about the Germans' Understanding of History, trans. James Knowlton and Truett 
Cates (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993). See also Volker Berghahan, "The Unmastered 
and Unmasterable Past," Journal of Modern History, Volume 63 , Issue 3 (September 1991), 546-554: 
Saul Friedlander, "Uberlegungen zur Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus," in Dan Diner, ed. , 1st 
der Nationalsozialismus Geschichet? Zur Historisierrung und Historikerstreit (Frankfurt am Main: 
Fischer Taschenbuch, 1987), 34-50. 
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order to rehabilitate discredited German national traditions.39 The debate, which 
would most likely have remained contained within the walls of academia was 
transformed into a national storm that unleashed its fury on the pages of German 
newspapers, radio and television talk show, and in other various public arenas. The 
two main questions of the historian's debate can be formulated as thus: What 
historical methods should be used to discuss and explain the Holocaust and the Nazi 
past? What are the political implications of such methods in Germany today? 
Thus the Historikerstreit sought to find a way to talk about the twelve years of 
Nazism that would diminish the crimes that were committed and place the victitnhood 
of Gemany on the same plane as that of the Jews. This relativism of Nolte ' s is 
dangerous. If a crime of this magnitude can be relativised to the likes of any other 
mass murder then it looses its uniqueness and if that happens then we are in danger of 
repeating past transgressions. Germany has not been granted the breathing space to 
move on because we cannot allow it. The Holocaust must remain in the forefront of 
memory for as long as it can. 
The interpretation of choice once unification was achieved was that of 
Germany as victim. Germans would like for their history to have happened to them. 
They want to have suffered from themselves in the same way that everyone suffered 
from them. Germans wanted to believe in the myth that Gennany was "seized" in 
1933 by Adolf Hitler and "occupied" for twelve dark years and then was "liberated" 
in 1945. This "victim Germany" was the only version that East and West could agree 
upon when the wall came tumbling down. 
39 Karl Wilds, "Identity and the Culture of Contrition: Recasting 'Normality ' in the Berlin Republic," 
German Politics, Volume 9, Issue 1, (2000), 85. 
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The 1990's: Normalization as Ritualization 
What a better starting point for our discussion of German memory of the Nazi 
period in contemporary society than 1989, which witnessed an event that set off a 
domino effect all across Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall and Germany's 
rush toward unification. "Forward, but forgetting nothing" was the phrase emblazed 
on a sign carried by detnonstrators in East Berlin during the last tumultuous days of 
the GDR. These lines were meant to show support for the political transformation that 
was underway and offer to the world that sat in trepidation of the unification of 
Germany this pledge, "don't woiTy, we won't forget what happened." The world 
didn't have to worry because with unification Germany's scholars, as well as ordinary 
Germans, began debating German history with renewed vigor that surprised most 
observers. 
With much jubilation the world watched as the much-despised Berlin Wall 
came toppling down in the fall of 1989. One reaction to this event, given German 
history and its tortuous waltz with national identity, would have been to surmise that 
since Germany was whole again all of the problems which had plagued the divided 
nation would now dissolve. Naive thing such as this was one-hundred and eighty 
degrees from reality in the newly united Germany. Rudy Koshar has posited that 
reunification was more than a process of economic and political synchronization: it 
was also a struggle over symbols.40 The symbols which Koshar mentions will become 
evident as I proceed. 
Immediately following unification three basic public controversies 
surrounding the Holocaust surfaced. Viewed together these controversies serve to 
4
° Koshar, 3. 
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shed light on the role that the Nazi atrocities continue to play in the formation of a 
new national identity for post-unification. The first of these controversies was a 
traveling exhibition called "Crimes of the German Armed Forces," which was 
accompanied by loud protests from right-wing and neo-Nazi groups. The exhibition 
touched off a wider discussion and called for a re-examination of the traditional roles 
of certain sectors of society, especially the role of the armed forces. 41 
The second of these controversies was over the publication of Daniel Jonah 
Goldhagen' s book Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust (1996). Within this work Goldhagen describes anti-Semitism as the driving 
force behind the willingness of Germans to participate in the mass murder of Jews. 
He argues that there was precious little protest when it came to measures against the 
Jews, because of a virtually unchallenged image of Jews as enemies of Germany. 
This perception, argues Goldhagen, made it relatively easy to mobilize against 
unarmed men, women, and children. Goldhagen's book-tour through Germany 
opened up a new debate on the issue of individual guilt of "ordinary Germans" under 
National Socialism. So shocking was his work it generated a yearlong discussion in 
Germany. Prior to the German language edition his book, its theses and Goldhagen 
himself were rejected, but with the publication of his work in Gem1any the reception 
became one of tentative reluctance. Perhaps what was most shocking was the 
acceptance of his work in Germany by the general population. By the close of the 
year, Daniel Goldhagen and his work, received much acclaim for having affected an 
important change in how Germans regarded their national past and won him the 
Democracy Prize. 
41 Rudiger Graf, "The Battle Over the Berlin Holocaust Memorial," The New Presence (July 1998). 
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The "Goldhagen debate" began as most things do in Germany, on the front 
page of the German newspaper Die Zeit. The protagonist for the discussion begun on 
April 12, 1996, was Volker Ullrich, political editor for Die Zeit. Ullrich claimed that 
with his work, Goldhagen had provoked a new Historikerstreit, referring to the 1986 
Historikerstreit over the uniqueness of the Holocaust in the normalization of German 
history. Ullrich pointed out that Goldhagen's work had stirred-up old fissures which 
ten years had not been able to heal. 42 The Democracy Prize was awarded to 
Goldhagen not so much on his work alone but rather on what his work achieved in the 
public realm. I quote the speech given by Habermas at the awards ceremony who 
decreed that Goldhagen had received this award on the following grounds: "through 
the urgency, and forcefulness, and the moral strength of his presentation" Goldhagen 
has "provided a powerful stimulus to the public conscience of the Federal Republic," 
he has sharpened "our sensibility for what constitutes the background and the limit of 
a German normalization."43 The third controversy which was to grip post-unified 
Germany was the proposed Berlin Holocaust Memorial to the Murdered Jews of 
Europe. This controversy will be taken up at length in the pages to come. 
Once the wall fell in November 1989, "victim Germany" was the only view of 
history that both East and West Germans could agree upon. Even now the two 
conjoined Germanys share one coffilnon desire: they are determined to consign the 
Nazi past to "history." They feel compelled to resolve the contradictory duty to both 
42 I need to mention an ironic occurrence, when Goldhagen was awarded the Democracy Prize from the 
Blatter for deutsche und internationale Politik, Journal for German and International Politics, the man 
who gave the laudatory remarks was Jiirgen Habermas, the man who had initiated the 1986 
Historikerstreit. 
43 Jiirgen Habermas, "Goldhagen and the Public use of History: Why a Democracy Prize for Daniel 
Goldhagen?" in Unwilling Germans? The Goldhagen Debate, Robert R. Shandley ed., (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 263. 
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remember and to forget. Jane Kramer has argued that today Germans want "symbolic 
simplicities of objectification." They no longer want to deal with the "painful plain 
truths" and refuse to further capitulate to the haughty stares of the rest of the world 
which continued to call up pictures of obsessive forms of order, domination, and pure 
evil anytime "German" is mentioned. Rather, Germans today prefer the ritualized 
monuments, memorials, and "commemorative sites" that "take memory and deposit 
it, so to speak, in the landscape, where it can be visited at appropriate ceremonial 
moments, but where it does not interfere unduly with the business of life at hand."44 
It's unclear as to why Germans realize that ritualization was all form with no 
substance. This is where the necessity of the Berlin Holocaust Memorial enters. There 
is a fragmentation of memory within Germany today. This new metnorial is going to 
serve to join these together into one. The memorial is not going to be a ritual that 
consoles through its' banality of memory. Berlin needs a memorial to encourage 
future generations to reconcile themselves with the past. Alongside the sites of former 
concentration camps, which serve as authentic markers of Nazi crimes, a central 
memorial in Berlin could serve as a symbol of the new Germany. 
After fifty years of suppressing and ritualizing the crimes of WWII Germans 
are now prepared to say yes, it happened, it is part of our collective identity. Getmans 
are unique they cannot move on, they cannot master their past. Remembering must 
become an active part of their new identity. This new Germany isn't looking to 
suppress its legacy of guilt but rather considers this legacy to be an integral 
component of its collective identity. They must embrace their past and their memory 
44 Jane Kramer, "Letters from Germany: The Politics ofMemory," The New Yorker (August 14, 1995), 
48-65. 
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of it and be actively engaged. The Berlin Holocaust Memorial will cultivate this 
active discourse. 
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II 
History and Identity: 
Cultures of Commemoration East and West 
lch waiss, Ginterchen, em Was ten is baser em Osten is scheener. 
- Gunter Grass 1 
Throughout its long, fragmented, and violent history the German 
nation has undergone tremendous shifts in leadership, policy, borders, and 
ideals. One should not be surprised to find then that the post-war process of 
remembering the Nazi era, a particularly problematic titne, would also be 
characterized by discord and restlessness. Why and how Germany should 
recall this era of its past is of enormous importance because of the questions it 
raises about the connections between memory and identity. I hope to highlight 
in this chapter the general trends which have prevailed since the conclusion of 
hostilities. Further, tny hope is that by taking the observer through Gem1any' s 
chronology of remembrance since 1871 one will be able to speculate where 
the future of German Holocaust memory is headed. 
Rudy Koshar has analyzed modem societies' "anxious call for 
memory." Koshar cites a quote by Gertrude Stein as a fitting aphorism for his 
anxiety, "everything destroys itself in the twentieth century and nothing 
1 Giinter Grass, "Truth in a Broken Mirror," The Guardian (January 27, 2001). "Giinter, love, I know 
the west is better, but the east is more beautiful." This is a phrase that Gunter's aunt whispered into his 
ear in 1958 and he says has run throughout his books, weighing up the east and the west, and still today 
gives him a perspective. 
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continues."2 There is this prevailing pessimistic fear that modem society, with 
all its technological advances, has no place for memory of our past. There is 
also a sense that society is moving as such a fast pace that if left unchecked 
and unpreserved we will soon forget our past as if it had never existed at all. 
As a modem society we are not engaged with our past, that is, we are a self-
absorbed people with limited time and interest in our past culture. This in turn 
breeds anxiety or alienation: anxiety about our future and alienation from our 
past. The anxious calls for preservation comes from what Koshar calls the 
"self-betrayal" of identity through architectural preservation. He argues that 
the process of reconstructing the past has always been limited by what was 
physically possible, and that preservationists and their political allies have 
developed historically specific rhetorics to deal with this self-betrayal. This 
self-betrayal that Koshar mentions is essentially about the use of history in the 
public realm and describes how the micropolitics of historical preservation in 
Germany "subverted the larger political goal of building pasts, which was the 
'imaging' of national continuity, stability, and identity in the built 
environment. "3 In describing this self-betrayal Koshar issues a warning about 
positing identity and affirms that collective memories outcomes are never 
predictable. 
2 Rudy Koshar, "Building Past: Historic Preservation and Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany," in 
Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity , John R. Gilles, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 215. Stein was describing Picasso here and the fact that he knew the earth was 
not the same as it had been in the nineteenth century and he inevitably made his work different. Stein 
said of the twentieth century, "[it] has a splendor which is its own ... things destroyed as they have 
never been destroyed." From Gertrude Stein, Writings 1932-1946. 
3 Ibid. , 230. 
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Koshar describes the plethora of movements for historic preservation, 
the maintenance, restoration, or recycling of buildings, districts, townscapes, 
and the historical memory attached to them in both the North American and 
European theaters. So intense has this anxiety been in German-speaking lands 
it has been referred to as the "cult of monument."4 Koshar, and others, have 
attributed the driving force for this phenomenon in Germany to its 
preoccupation with continuity, which has been sorely lacking in German 
history. 5 
Vergangenheitsbewiiltigung, mastering the past, is the German word 
used to describe the efforts of Germans to come to terms with, the Nazi past, 
especially the murder of the European Jews. But what does this phrase, 
"Coming to terms with the past," coined by Theodor Adorno, mean? Adorno 
addressed this issue in an article entitled, "What Does Coming to Terms with 
the Past Mean?'' published in 1959. He stated that "Coming to terms with the 
past does not imply a serious working through of the trauma. "6 It suggests, 
rather, a wishing to tum the page and, if possible, wiping it from memory. 
This process, begun perhaps while WWII still raged, continues to this day in 
Germany. The Berlin Holocaust Memorial may serve as the capstone of this 
process. The construction of this monolithic memorial, and the two-decade 
long process to decide on the tnemorial, just might be the largest historical 
4 1bid., 215. The twentieth-century usage of this term began with Austrian art historian Alois Reigl 
when he used it in 1905 and later in the 1970s when Hessian conservator Reinhard Bentmann used it to 
criticize West German nostalgia. 
5 Ibid., 215-238. 
6 Theodor W. Adorno, "What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean," in Bitburg in Moral and 
Political Perspective, Geoffrey Hartman ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 225-
129. 
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"eraser" ever constructed, the working through, rather than recognition, which 
Adorno described. This "mastering the past," never having been an easy task, 
became even more cumbersome in 1991 with the official reuniting of the two 
Germanys into one nation. Like two dancers in search of the right partner to 
achieve a beautiful, fluid waltz the two Germanys melding of Holocaust 
memories has not been without a few bruised toes. 
This chapter will seek to answer four questions. First, why did public 
memory of the period 1938-1945 diverge along political or ideological lines? 7 
That is, why was it that West German public memory of the Holocaust found 
sympathy for Jewish victims and their plight while in East Germany such 
feelings were suppressed and Jews found not sympathy but rather indirect 
recognition garbed in an antifascist cloak? Second, how did public memory 
and the democratic left and right in the West and the Communist dictatorship 
in the East approach the dual issues of memory and penance? Third, how did 
the Cold War affect discussion of the Jewish tragedy in both Germanys? 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, how have the two nations of East and 
West Germany combined their remembrance of the Holocaust in order to 
rebuild as one nation? 
A short discussion on the concept of nation identity needed. Among 
intellectuals and social historians the primary assertion made regarding 
national identity is that it is first and foremost a human construct. It is an 
"imagined community," in which its participants may never personally 
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encounter each other. 8 National identity is only evident when a sufficient 
number of people believe in the same version of the collective identity. 
Further, for this abstract concept to become a social reality in which it is 
recognized throughout the population and perceived to be legitimate by those 
not participating in its construct, namely outsiders, it must be transmitted via 
institutions, laws, customs, beliefs, and practices. As Mary Fulbrook argues, 
in many quarters this belief in and quest for national identity is remarkably 
strong. 9 Germany is and will remain to be for many decades to come the 
textbook case for this phenomenon. In a sense this overriding desire to 
achieve a "correct" national identity has become an obsession for the Gennan 
people. 
The quest to define a German national identity is not a new concept. 
The pursuit of people living within the loosely defined borders of the Holy 
Roman Empire to find a sense of sameness, of nationhood, of German-ness 
took them on a twisted and often times destructive voyage through titne. This 
trek has been labeled by some analysts as the Sonderweg thesis. Sonderweg 
postulates that Germany pursued a "different" path in national development 
compared to other Western. The argument is that Getmany never experienced 
a liberal revolution as had Britain, France, and the American colonies and as a 
consequence Germany's "torturous" past. There are many others who describe 
7 Public memory defined as that which is adopted and supported by the national government through 
narratives, museums, education, ceremony, etc. Throughout this work public memory will refer to the 
official, state sponsored, memory. 
8 Benedict Anderson, Imaged Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism , 
(New York: Verso, 1991). 
9 Mary Fulbrook, German National Identity After the Holocaust, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 
Inc., 1999). 
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the uniqueness of German nation building by demonstrating a direct link from 
Luther's Wittenberg Thesis to Hitler's Mein Kampf These schools of thought 
about German national development illuminate Germany's quest to "get it 
right" when struggling with its Nazi past and post-war identity. To most 
observers at that time the process which post-war memory of the period 1938-
1945 took within the divided Getman nation was of no consequence. It is only 
with hindsight that one sees the radically different processes that were at work 
as the Holocaust was remembered in the two Germanys and the effects they 
produced upon their citizens. 
Most commentators argue that the answers to questions regarding the 
divergent course which memory took in the two post-war nations of West and 
East Germany lie sotnewhere other than the Nazi era itself. 10 Jeffrey Herf, in 
Divided Memory, finds his answer to the riddle in pre-1933 Germany, namely 
the Weimar Republic. 11 In order to explain the differences in the public 
remembrance of the crimes of the Nazi Herf makes his argument for multiple 
restorations. 12 This term refers to the continuities that link the German 
political tradition of Weimar to the anti-Nazi period after 1945. What he 
argues is that all the political leaders in both East and West Germany 
10 The literature on narratives and meaning of the Holocaust is extensive. See Saul Friedlander, 
Memory, HistOJy, and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 1993); Peter Hayes, ed. , Lesson and Legacies: The Meaning of the Holocaust in a Changing 
World (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1991); Saul Friedlander, ed. , Probing the Limits 
of Representation Nazism and the "Final Solution" (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1992); Charles Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); Dominick LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust: 
History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); and James E. Young, The 
Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). 
11 Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1997). 
12 Ibid., 3. 
53 
"reentered" political life after WWII. Herf argues that these men were all 
involved in German politics prior to the Third Riech. These men all came of 
age between 1900 and 1930. They experienced Nazism, World War II, and the 
Holocaust in their mature years rather then in their tender, formative age. 
Among the West Germans were such notable men as Konrad Adenauer, Kurt 
Schumacher, Theodor Heuss, and Ernst Reuter. On the East German side, 
Walter Ulbricht, Otto Grotewohl, Wilhelm Pieck, and Paul Merker. Herf 
posits that the inherited traditions and ideologies of these leaders carried with 
them in their hearts and minds and became a precious source of tneaning in 
which to interpret the present and shape the memory of the recent past. 13 
Germany's struggles with it problematic past have continually 
mutated. There is a consensus among historians as to what this mutation 
resembles. Anita Grossmann describes those who make a career out of 
observing Germany's tussles with its past as remaining intrigued by a moving 
target, "swinging between anxious remembrance and resentful denial, that just 
won't go away and keeps tnutating, seemingly with increasing speed and 
intensity." 14 Geoff Eley Believes that a constant feature of German politics 
and culture is an oscillation between the drive to forget and establish a sense 
of nonnalcy in their history and a compulsive need to retnember, 
commemorate and work through questions of guilt and responsibility. 15 These 
perspectives capture the mood of German memory work. This is precisely 
13 Ibid. , 4. 
14 Anita Grossmann, "The 'Goldhagen Effect': Memory, Repetition, and Responsibility in the New 
Germany," in The "Goldhagen Effect": History, Memory, Nazism - Facing the German Past, Geoff 
Eley, ed., (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2000), 89. 
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because those involved in the debates over the meaning of the German past 
are a much larger group then the limited audience of academic historians. The 
debate encompasses all levels of civil society. 
Every decade since 1945 has been characterized by attempts to 
remember the Holocaust which are linked to very specific aims of German 
rehabilitation. I will examine each of these periods of remembrance and 
discuss the unique memory work that mark each. These observations are 
divided between considerations of the German Democratic Republic, the 
"East" and the Federal Republic, the "West." 
In Germany as a whole the struggle over what to do with their Nazi 
past began at Stunde Null, the "zero Hour," of 1945. However, after the 
Trii.mmerzeit, Gennany's time of ruins, the West's economic miracle, and the 
East's isolation within the Soviet bloc, all worked against any significant 
confrontation with the Nazi past. Saul Friedlander cites the onion-cutting 
ceremony in Gunter Grass' The Tin Drum as symbolic of a Germany that was 
unable to shed tears without artificial stimulation. 16 In her work, The Divided 
Nation: A History of Germany, 1918-1990, Mary Fulbrook argues that 
Germans repressed their past entirely and allowed the public soul to wither 
and die. 17 On the other hand, in a 1983 article, political philosopher Hermann 
Lubbe asserted that, "A certain silence was the social-psychological and 
politically necessary medium for the transformation of our postwar population 
15 Geoff Eley ed. , The "Goldhagen Effect, " 90-91. 
16 Saul Friedlander, Mem01y, History, and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe, (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1993), 3. 
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into the citizenry of the Federal Republic of Germany." 18 Rudy Koshar argues 
that even though "Silence has been the dominant metaphor for historical 
accounts of the German memory of Nazism in the immediate postwar years," 
the notion of "commemorative noise" would more aptly define this period. 19 
Koshar contends that "amnesia" about the crimes of the Nazis is a more 
accurate diagnosis of the problem of German remembrance than believing 
Germans deliberately remained silent about the regimes crimes. Worldwide 
expectations that Germans would mourn their lost Jews were disappointed. 
Jost Hermand provides a plausible explanation for why this failed to happen. 
"Most Germans," he writes, "who themselves went through much suffering, 
and who during the postwar period were concerned at first above all with 
sheer survival, simply said nothing about these things."20 And Gunter Grass 
wrote that in the immediate postwar years "there was no collapse, no absolute 
beginning, just sluggish and murky transitions."21 
Historians have viewed the first postwar phase that Germans 
underwent in confronting the Holocaust and its consequences differently. 
Wolfgang Benz argues that the collapse of National Socialist rule was 
followed by a phase of public remembrance and working through of what had 
happened characterized by a plethora of personal accounts of prosecution and 
resistance and an explosion of cultural and political media commenting on 
17 Mary Fulbrook, The Divided Nation: A History of Germany, 1918-1990, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 163, 176. 
18 Hermann Liibbe, quoted in Anson Rabinbach, "The Jewish Question in the German Question," New 
German Critique. No. 44 (Spring/Summer 1988), 159-192. 
19 Rudy Koshar, Germany's Transient Pasts: Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth 
Century, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 199. 
20 J ost Hermand, ??? 
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National Socialism. However, this period of confrontation with their 
transgressions was brief. Benz links the end of this period of retrospection 
with the end of the Allied occupation, the establishment of a new sovereign 
state and a sense optimism about the future created by the "economic 
miracle." Germans quickly slipped into a new phase in their remembering, 
which has been labeled amnesia, and from that forgetting they quickly turned 
to rejection.22 Anita Grossman argues against Benz and says that this is hardly 
a history of amnesia. Rather she posits that in every decade remembering the 
Holocaust has been necessary for the rehabilitation of Germans even if that 
remembrance has taken different forms. 23 By the close of the 1940's the "Iron 
Curtain" bifurcated German memory and the two Germanys began to pursue 
very different paths of public memory. 
The perfect launching point for the discussion of divergent metnory 
work in the two Germanys is provided by Herf s summary of the place 
occupied in public discourse by anti-Semitism and the Jewish catastrophe in 
the immediate post-war years: 
.. .it was the West, not the East, German government that 
offered financial restitution to Jewish survivors of the 
Holocaust, established close relations with the state of Israel, 
gave the Holocaust a place- in time a rather prominent place -
in the national political memory, and, after disastrous delay, 
even conducted more trials of suspected perpetrators of crimes 
committed during the Nazi era. Conversely, East German 
leaders kept the Jewish question on the margin of narratives of 
the Nazi era, refused to pay restitution to Jewish survivors or to 
Israel, purged those Communist leaders who sought to give it 
21 Giinter Grass, "Kopfgeburten, order die Deutschen Sterben aus" Continuity and Change, 205. 
22 Wolfgang Benz, "Postwar Society and National Socialism: Remembrance, Amnesia, Rejection," Tel 
AviverJahrbuchfor Deutsche Geschichte, Volume 19, 1990, 1-12. 
23 Grossman, 92. 
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greater prominence, and even gave tangible support to Israel's 
armed adversaries.24 
After the war the top priority in the American zone of occupation was to 
"cure" the Gennans of their "megalomania, the ideology of race and their claim to 
world domination. "25 Germans, in the opinion of the free world, had allowed the 
greatest human tragedy of historical record to unfold in their backyards. The world 
had at one time viewed Germany as an intellectual breeding ground for great thinkers, 
which had produced the likes of Kant, Goethe, Nietzsche, and Fichte, all 
comrnentating on the human condition. However, Germany's reputation as a land of 
education and high culture was obliterated. After 1945 Germany was looked upon as 
a barbaric land which was in need of recivilizing and a deep catharsis from within. 
The re-civilizing procedures such as "de-Nazification," and education in democracy 
under Allied tutelage were initiated and carried out by the respective occupying 
forces. Similar to the plight of a chastised child, once Germany's repentance was 
acknowledged to be complete by the rest of the world they would then be invited to 
take their place again at the table of civilized nations. 
If 1945-1950 was a dismal time in Germany the beginning of a new decade 
saw a shift in accelerating affluence that began with the "economic miracle." The 
Cold War had crystallized into the form it would maintain until 1989 and the Berlin 
Wall was under construction. The Allies of the war were now adversaries. The decade 
witnessed the return of German soldiers from Soviet prisoner of war camps which 
served to initiate an energetic remembering of German "victimhood," while the 
24 Herf, 3. 
25 Benz, 1. 
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remembrance of Nazi victims became less prominent, or subordinated to building the 
new West German state. 
In the East, or the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as it was formally 
known, the process of remembering was entirely planned and implemented by the 
government. As Claudia Koonz suggests the East forgot the genocide of the Jews, but 
did remember the Nazi crimes because it benefited their state formation. In fact one 
could argue that the history of the GDR was founded on the Communist interpretation 
of Nazism and fascism as extremes of capitalism. This ideological position indicted 
NATO along with the Federal Republic. Koonz summarizes this developtnent; 
"Brutal Nazi crimes and heroic Communist opposition became part of the founding 
myth of the Socialist state."26 Soviet officials ambitiously carried out the de-
Nazification policies of the Communist government. Thousands of suspected war 
criminals and Nazi sympathizers were jailed or placed in former concentration camps. 
The communist occupiers were as adept at propaganda as Hitler had been. They 
transformed the causes of WWII through Marxist theory into a struggle between 
workers and capitalists. Jeffrey Herf argues in Divided Memory, that this assertion 
was derived from the Com intern's belief that fascism was essentially a dictatorial, 
terrorist, and imperialist form of finance capitalism. The communists were always 
very careful to refer to Nazism as "German fascism" and were able to thus link the 
whole war to class struggle. The anti-Semitic element of Nazism was in essence 
swept under the carpet and thus "the East forgot the Jews" as the Soviet Union 
enforced an official narrative of how Eastern Europe had been liberated from the evil 
59 
fascists by the Red Army. So problematic were the Jews for the "East" that the 
Soviets were unable to mention the Jews which were murdered at Babi Y ar. The 
memorial erected in 1974, contains Ukrainian text that reads: On this site there will 
be a monument for the victims of fascism (during the German occupation of Kiev, 
1941-1943." The killing of an estimated 100,000 people, over a period of months 
(some sources say years), and included mostly Jews is to this day not mentioned. 
One may ask what's wrong with this imposed official history after all, isn't 
history always written by the winners? Koonz cites a 1975 letter written by Vaclav 
Havel to the Czech President Gustav Husak that described the effects of an imposed 
official history. Havel stated that, "Organized oblivion in totalitarian states in1poses a 
single narrative that vindicates the leaders and vilifies their enemies, but leaves the 
average citizen cynical and alienated from what really happened."27 This became 
particularly troublesome in Germany after 1991. East Germany in the immediate 
years following the end of the war becrune a vast sea of plaques, small monuments, 
gravestones, and historical markers in which there was no tnention of Jews not even 
in the former concentration camps which had been declared memorials to the "victims 
of fascism. "28 
The West, or the Federal Republic of Germany, received its international 
legitimacy as a nation from its commitment to Western democracy and restitution to 
Jewish victims. Its internal legitimacy of Adenauer and the CSU/CDU politicians was 
26 Claudia Koonz, "Between Memory and Oblivion Concentration Camps in German Memory," in 
Commemoration: The Politics of National Identity, John R. Gillis, ed., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 264. 
27 Vaclav Hvel, "Dear Dr. Husak, in "Open Letters: Selected Writings, 1964-1990 (New York: Knopf, 
1991), 73-74. Cited in Koon's essay "Between Memory and Oblivion". 
28 See Claudia Koonz's essay "Between Memory and Oblivion" for a discussion of the signjficance of 
concentration camps as memorials. 
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based on compassion for German "victims," which had the added benefit of 
moderating the Allied efforts at de-Nazification and punishment of Nazi war 
criminals. 
There is a widely held opinion that in the 1950's the citizens of the Federal 
Republic largely avoided all tnemories of the years of Nazi rule. Alexander and 
Margarete Mitscherlich, writing in 1967, Die Unflihigkeit zu trauern, The Inability to 
Mourn, formulated the central theme of this point of view. They posited that West 
Germans became so caught up in the "expansion and modernization of [their] 
industrial potential right down to the kitchen utensils," that they were able to avoid 
the past.29 They described this phenomenon as the German "inability to mourn," a 
famous diagnosis that demonstrated the need for the onion-cutting ceremony in 
Grass's The Tin Drum. Robert Moeller asserts that with few exceptions the 
Mitscherlichs' theme has become part and parcel of most accounts of the Federal 
Republic's first decade. Wolfgang Benz uses the trial of Veit Harlan to illustrate this 
point. Harlan, the director of the notorious National Socialist film that became the 
prototype of all anti-Semitic films, Jud Suj3, (1940) was tried in 1949 for crimes 
against humanity. His defense consisted of denying any and all responsibility for the 
National Socialist dictatorship in Germany. Harlan asserted that he too had been 
abused by the regime, that he had been placed under n1assive pressure by Goebbels, 
that he had tried to refuse the commission to make the film, and finally, after this had 
29 Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, Die Unfiihigkeit zu trauern: Grundlagen Kollektiven 
Verhaltens (Munich, 1967), 19. In Robert G. Moeller "War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the 
Ferderal Republic of Germany." American Historical Review (October 1996), 1011. Using Freudian 
categories to analyze the postwar German psyche the Mitscherlichs argued that after 1945 Germans 
should have come to an understanding of their deep identification with Hitler and his national 
community and thus acknowledge the crimes that were committed by the regime that they supported in 
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failed, had undermined the anti-Semitic message of the film in an artistic way.30 The 
Harlan case is significant in several ways for individual and collective structures of 
consciousness and memory. Like others, Veit Harlan, was a beneficiary of the regitne 
and when charged he withdrew to the position of unpolitical and completely naive 
artist. Harlan is a fitting aphorism for the rest of German societies inability to mourn 
because of their perceived lack of guilt and professed naivete. 
By 1961 the completion of the Berlin Wall completely separated the German 
people into two states and the two divergent memories of the Holocaust era were 
entrenched. Claudia Koonz describes the division of memory, "East Germans forgot 
the Jews. West Germans forgot the Nazi and for a time also submerged the memory 
of genocide."31 This mentality was not to hold true for the entire decade. In the 
1960's the framework for a safe and ritualized official memory of the Holocaust was 
broken apart in the Federal Republic. 32 A tremendous shift in public memory was 
about to take place as many West Germans began to call for a more complex analysis 
of the National Socialist regime and the war. A recovery of Holocaust memory was 
beginning to take place in the West. The Eichmann trial in 1961, Raul Hilberg's, 
Destruction of the European Jews (1961), Hannah Arendt's, Eichmann in Jerusalem 
(1963), and the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials (1964), which have been poignantly 
illustrated in Bernhard Schlink's recent novel, The Reader, all inspired mass public 
comment. Coupled with the student movement in the last half of the decade "whose 
overwhelming numbers. The Mitscherlichs argue that by creating for the future Germans were 
forgetting the past. 
30 Benz, 2-3. Veit Harlan's de-Nazification proceedings were never officially concluded, but de facto 
he was placed in the category of"guiltless" in December 1947. 
31 Koonz, 263. 
32 Geoff Eley, ed. , The "Gold hagen Effect" Histmy, Memory, Nazism - Facing the German Past (Ann 
Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2000), 1. 
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forceful challenge to the comforts and conventions of West German society was 
heavily dependent on an accusatory confrontation with the older generation's Nazi 
past," a new awareness of Nazi crimes all lent themselves to a "recover" of memory 
for a new generation. 33 
The 1960's ushered in the beginnings of a new memorial culture in Germany. 
The past in which Germans were victims receded and was replaced by a history of the 
Third Reich in which Nazi atrocities took center stage. German' s memory of 
themselves as victimizers rather than as victims was starting to take shape. It was the 
mid-1960's which saw the establishment of exhibits and memorials at the former 
death camps ofDachau and Neuengamme in 1965 and Bergen-Belsen in 1966. 
Grossman claims that even a modest memorial culture was developing in the 
GDR during this decade, though I would argue that it was radically different frotn the 
one initiated in the West and with very different motivating factors. In 1958 and 1961 
the East German government dedicated two major memorials to the victitns of 
fascism at the sites of former Nazi concentration camps, Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen. These memorials set into stone the official antifascist memory in the 
East. Both ceremonies praised fallen soldiers and the German resistance tnore than 
they mourned the Jews. Walter Ulbricht delivered the dedication speech at 
Sachsenhausen on April 24, 1961. Herf has taken a segment of this speech and used it 
to highlight the memory path that the East traversed: 
With deepest respect we tum to our precious dead, the fighters against 
war, fascism, and militarism, and to the victims of Nazi terror. This 
place is dedicated to memory and warning: to the memory of countless 
martyrs and heroes of the antifascist resistance struggle and to warning 
coming generations never again to allow fascist barbarism to break out 
33 Ibid., 1. 
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among our own people, or among other peoples. Every foot of this 
earth is soaked with the blood and sweat of ten thousand martyrs from 
many countries, and of many different worldviews. They were driven 
and tortured to death, and murdered only because they loved their 
people, because they loved freedom, peace, and democracy more then 
their own life, because they were socialists, because they rejected 
hatred among peoples and rejected genocide, and because they 
dedicated their lives to humanism and to friendship among peoples. 34 
Ironically enough this speech was delivered just four short months before Ulbricht 
ordered the construction of the Berlin Wall. One can see that he clearly drew a line 
connecting the anti-Nazi resisters who died in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp 
with the East German propaganda offensive against West Germany. There was no 
mention of Jews whatsoever in his speech. Though he mentioned "martyrs and 
heroes" who had been murdered only because of their political convictions he failed 
to state that the Jews at Sachsenhausen and elsewhere had not been murdered because 
of their political actions, but rather simply because they were Jews. 
Mass emigration at a rate of 150,000 to 200,000 people a year, econom1c 
failure, unsuccessful efforts to gain diplomatic recognition, and the acceptance of 
West Germany into NATO left the East German government isolated and lacking 
support from their populace during this era. One way to divert attention away from 
their domestic problems was to focus on the West. In what has been described as East 
Berlin's most effective propaganda themes of the Cold War, Albert Norden, director 
of the Ausschuss fur Deutsche Einheit, Committee for German Unity, led the assault 
on the West and Adenauer's administration. With numerous press conferences, 
speeches, and essays he alleged that ex-Nazi and war criminals were in positions of 
power within the West's government and held posts in the judicial, military, 
34 
"Walter Ulbricht bei der Einweihung der Gedenkstatte Sachsenhausen: Von der DDR wird stets der 
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econom1c, and diplomatic branches, as well as maintaining positions among the 
intellectual elites.35 One statement Norden released on October 14, 1957, titled 
"Hitler's Special Judges - Pillars of the Adenauer Government."36 In 1959 the 
Committee for German Unity published We Accuse: Eight Hundred Bloodstained 
Nazi Judges Uphold the Adenauer Regime. The report claimed that the judges were 
guilty of crimes under the Nazi regime that they had been a willing tool in the 
regime. 37 In short all the leaders in East Germany had participated in anti-Nazi 
resistance. 
December 1970 took Holocaust remembrance into yet another direction with 
Chancellor Willy Brandt's dramatic genuflection at the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial. 
Because of Ostpolitik Brankt felt that it was time to put aside the provincial Cold War 
anticommunist sentiments. He and his supporters asserted that had Germany not 
invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 the Red Army would not have found itself in the 
middle of Europe in 1945. This event has been described by some as having set off a 
new culture of commemoration and repentance. Brandt's genuflection marked the 
first time a West German chancellor had so publicly acknowledged and expressed 
remorse and atonement for what the Germans had done to the peoples of Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union during WWII. This shift in politics of memory was seen 
as a necessary step for diplomatic success in Eastern Europe and Moscow. Brandt 
was hoping to communicate to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that West 
Frieden ausstrahlen," Neues Deutschland (April24, 1961), 1-3. Quoted in Herf, 178-179. 
35 Herf, 182-183. 
36 Committee for German Unity, Hitler's Special Judges - Pillars of the Adenauer Government, 
International Press Confemce of the Committee for German Unity, October 14, 1957 (East Berlin: 
Committee for German Unity, 1957), 1. 
37 Committee for German Unity, We Accuse: Eight Hundred Bloodstained Nazi Judges Uphold the 
Adenauer Regime (East Berlin: Ausschuss fur Deutsche Einheit, 1959), 5. 
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Germany was not the fascist regtme bent on regaining lost territory that the 
Communist propaganda machine had spewed for twenty years. 38 
Social commentators have characterized the decade of the 1980' s in West 
Germany as having seen an explosion in memory, kicked off by the American 
produced series Holocaust in the fall of 1979. Andreas Huyssen has commented that 
the problem with Holocaust remembrance in the 80's and 90's was not forgetting 
what happened but rather the ubiquitousness of memory. With each generation's 
increased distance from the actual events there is more room within collective 
memory to focus on more than just the facts. 39 
Some scholars, such as Saul FriedHinder, have suggested that the call for a 
central memorial to victims of the Holocaust actually began with an American, 
namely President Ronald Reagan. The "Bitburg affair," as it became known took 
place on 5 May 1985 when Ronald Reagan and Helmut Kohl jointly visited the 
Bitburg military cemetery. The event was planned to commemorate 8 May 1945, the 
fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II. However, Reagan' s planned visit set 
off a string of protests both in the United States and Germany. The problem was that 
the cemetery in Bitburg was the burial site of forty-nine Waffen Schutzstaffel (SS) 
troops. Though these troops were essentially shock troops, used to stiffen the 
collapsing fronts with the advance of the Allied forces , they were part of an 
organization that carried out the Final Solution and were responsible for most of the 
more egregious war crimes committed by German forces in WWII. What Helmut 
Kohl had wanted to achieve by initiating this wreath-laying ceremony was to unite 
38 Herf, 345. 
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the oppressors and the victims in a common dialect. Kohl's argument was that his 
generation had not experienced WWII and therefore it was time to move history on 
into a new direction. Charles Maier suggests that the Bitburg ceremonies were 
intended to wipe away the last moral residues of probation under which the Federal 
Republic stilllabored.40 He continues that it was intended to be a ritual reconciliation 
which ended in a catharsis of sorts. Maier says that it was at this moment when 
memory escaped from its normal custodians' grips- politicians and academics- and 
became, in his words, a powerful and unpredictable force, "Bitburg history. "41 
Jeffrey Herfhas argued that the anti-fascist bent never abated in the East until 
the 1980's. Unlike the West, which witnessed significant shifts in public memory 
since 1945, the East maintained a constant stance toward public remembrance of the 
crimes of the Third Reich. However, this was to change in the 1980's when East 
Germany broke with their official polity of anti-fascism. 
Saul Friedlander, in Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews of 
Europe, suggests that a major question concerning German memory since the official 
reunification of the two Germanys in 1991 is whether this event marked the end of 
the post-war period and, if it has, will it induce a major change in the German 
encounter with the Nazi past? Will the new identity of unified Gennany move its 
Nazi past from memory into mere history? Debates surrounding the issue of how to 
preserve memory have only become more acute since the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
With the Wall gone historians and politicians found themselves engaged in an entirely 
39 Andreas Huyssen, "Monument and Memory in a Postmodem Age," The Yale Journal of Criticism 
vol. 6, no. 2, 1993, 257. 
4
° Charles Maier, The Unmasterable Past (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 9-16. 
41 Ibid., 9. 
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new dialogue, the era of divided memory ended. The climate of Germany during the 
1990's can only be described as electrically charged. 
The Wende, the tum, is now the term most closely associated with the 
monumental changes in 1989 that led to the unification of the two Germanys. 
Although politically the creation of a unified Gennany in 1990 was achieved in a 
relatively quick vote people became acutely aware that creating a new common 
national identity was going to take much longer. Because unification was achieved on 
West German terms many intellectuals raised virulent criticism. Among these was 
East Germanys refusal to reshape their version of WWII along the West German 
model. "Forward, but forgetting nothing," was the phrase that encapsulated the events 
in the autumn of 1989.42 This socialist slogan expressed support for the political 
transformation then underway, but it cautioned that a reunified Gennany could not 
leave history behind.43 Within a fortnight speculation arose over the possibility of a 
new bout with amnesia. A new, young right had emerged and dubbed themselves the 
"generation of 1989," as opposed to the leftist "generation of 1968."44 This group 
attacked Adenauer's option of Westernization and called for an end to the "rituals of 
atonement" of the Bonn Republic. Neo-Nazi and skinhead violence erupted against 
foreigners and Jews alike and brought fear among the global community that the 
unified Germany would again unleash its racist ghosts. From the beginning of 1991 to 
the fall of 1993, German government officials listed 4,500 acts of violence attributed 
to right-wing extremists groups directed at immigrants and Jews. These attacks 
42 Rudy Koshar, From Monuments to Traces: Artifacts of German Memory, 1870-1990 (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2000), 1. This line came from Bertolt Brecht's 1931 "Song of 
Solidarity," written for the film Kuhle Wampe. 
43 Ibid. , 1. 
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resulted in 26 murders and 1,800 injuries.45 Thousands of Germans marched in the 
streets to protest the wave of violence. 
One of the first major national political statements about the Nazi past 
following German unification was delivered within this climate. Rita Sussmuth, 
president of the Bundestag, delivered the speech that served to encapsulate the 
sentiments held by the new nation and put a public face on underlying issues that had 
been fermenting since 1989. The date Siissmuth spoke was the occasion of the fifty-
fifth anniversary of the pogrom of November 9, 1938. By recalling the events of the 
pogrom Siissmuth eloquently connected memory of the Nazi past with defense of 
human rights in the present. She described November 9, 1989 as the end of German 
division and the beginning of a common memory. Common memory, she continued, 
would help to guard against intolerance and violence. She expressed shame and anger 
over the recent attacks against Jews and itnmigrants within Germany. She called upon 
Germans to fight against anti-Semitism and hatred of foreigners, and use courage, just 
as the citizens of the CDR had done to win their battle for freedom, to defend "human 
dignity and democracy in all of Germany." She continued: 
Memory of the negatives of your own past does not weaken us, as we 
once feared. Rather it frees us from its burdens, transforms weaknesses 
into strengths, and leads us toward one another rather than against one 
another. Vigilant and alert memory [Wachs ames Erinnern] is the 
protector of freedom. If we forget unfreedom, persecution, and 
annihilation, we endanger our own freedom ... Memory does not stop 
when the Germans regained freedom and unity. 
While memory would continue to be subjected to political dispute, Siissmuth's speech 
marked the beginning of a "vigilant" and "common" memory in unified Germany. 
44 Herf, 366. 
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She called upon both traditions of official memory from West Germany and the 
dissenters in East Germany to fashion this common memory of the Nazi past and the 
Holocaust, and to apply its lessons to the defense of human rights and democracy in 
the present. 46 
The symbol of this new drive toward a common memory for unified Germany 
has become invested in the Berlin Holocaust Memorial. Everything that Gem1ans 
want to achieve, everything which they see carrying them into the third millennium 
has become affixed to the Monument. Half a century after the Holocaust, it is no 
longer the atrocities then1selves that are at the center of attention but rather how the 
heirs of the victims, perpetrators and bystanders are adjusting to the influx of 
memories and how they intend to keep these memories alive for the future. There 
were two forms of forgetting happening in the FRG and the GDR. The Monument is 
going to make this forgetting i1npossible by bringing the two forms together into a 
shared memory of the Jews. Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider attest to this recognition 
of the "other" which serves to diffuse the distinction between memories of victims 
and perpetrators and what retnains, they argue, is the memory of a shared past.47 
What remains is the memory of the Jews. 
45 Ibid., 366. 
46 Herf, 366 - 367. "Pdisidentin Dr. Rita Siissmuth," Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages 12. 
Wahlperiode Stenogrophische Bericht 1990, vol. 171 , 187-200 Sitzung (November 9, 1993), 10181. 
47 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, "Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of 
Cosmopolitan Memory," European Journal of Social Theory 5(1): 87-106. 
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III 
The Berlin Holocaust Memorial Initiative 
We're not building this memorial 
for the Jews or for other victims. 
We're building it for us. 
-Wolfgang Thierse 
Bundestag Speaker 
A few months more and the 
debate over the Holocaust 
memorial would have lasted as 
long as the Nazi regime that 
caused it. 
- Malte Lehming 
Op-ed editor 
Tagesspiegel 
If ever there was a case of an idea whose time had come a national Holocaust 
memorial in Germany was it. This idea, conceived with good intentions, was initiated 
with a naive speculation that it could be achieved with relative ease. Daniel 
Goldhagen has said that the Holocaust marked Germany's departure frotn the 
community of "civilized peoples."1 The completion of the Holocaust memorial in 
Berlin may be the final step Germany needs to take in order to reenter the world 
community after spending decades in exile. 
The question why a national monument to the "Murdered Jews of Europe" 
should be erected in Berlin is "multi-dimensional" and finds its answers in political, 
1 Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, (Alfred A. 
Knopf: NY, 1996), 4. 
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cultural, and historical contexts.2 The controversy surrounding the memorial has gone 
well beyond the polemical debate over whether there should be a monument or not. 
Over the years the multifaceted issues have been aired in similarly diverse venues: the 
media, professional conferences, the floor of the Bundestag, and around the tables of 
Biergartens. 
The memorial initiative has struggled over meaning and intent, form and 
function, and ultimately political verbiage. The memorial initiative has been 
helplessly suspended in a political quagmire for almost two decades. It has been the 
subject of debates ranging from the frivolous to the spiritual. But when it comes right 
down to it the debate is centered on one and only one problem: that different groups 
in Germany want to represent, remember, and memorialize the death of six million 
people in different ways. This chapter, then has three objectives: 
First, I will discuss the initiative behind the planned building of the Holocaust 
Memorial in Berlin. I will show, as Kuhlke claimed, how the Memorial is the result of 
forty years of conservative politics of memory in Western Germany, which 
persistently blurred the boundaries between Nazi victim and Nazi perpetrator, and 
successfully marginalized the memory of Jewish life and death in the Holocaust both 
socially and spatially. 3 
Second, I would like to discuss the location, which was selected for the 
memorial. Karen Till posited that "Place is the cultural and spatial context within 
2 James E. Young, "Germany's National Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe: A Report to the 
Bundestag Committee on Cultural and Media Affairs," Zeitschriftfor Kultur Austausch (March 3, 
1999). 
3 See OlafKuhlke, Body, Nation, and Place: The New Berlin Republic and the Spatial Representation 
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which we construct and locate our individual and collective identities."4 Therefore, 
the actual, physical site for the proposed memorial, I would argue, is worthy of our 
consideration. By placing this memorial in the heart of Berlin, this "concrete 
embodiment of memory,''5 conjured up a long-lasting debate over the issues of 
embodiment of memory in German society and in the public sphere. 
The idea of place has a dual meaning whether being discussed in an objective 
or subjective light. As an object, place means a region, or a material landscape fixed 
in place and time. As a subject place is something that we ''belong" to and attach 
subjective meanings to. Geographic concepts of place have tended to be divided into 
one of three meanings: location, locale, and sense of place. The richness of a place 
resides in its ambiguity, complexity, and multiple/contradictory meanings. It is within 
and through social and spatial contexts that we frame our collective memories. 
Central to the construction of collective memory and group identification is the 
creation, representation and interpretation of particular places. 
In the third section of this chapter I will begin to unravel the varytng 
arguments surrounding the construction of the Holocaust Memorial. Given that the 
discourse surrounding the Memorial is entering its second decade and the 
construction is barely underway there has been ample opportunity for all sides to 
voice their opinions. Even outside of Germany discussions encompassing government 
officials, eminent historians, art critics, journalists, Jews who lived through the 
of German National Identity, (Kent State University, 2001), 322. 
4 Karen Till, Place and Politics of Memmy: A Geo-Ethnography of Museums and Memorials in Berlin, 
(University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1996), 4. 
5 Kuhlke, 323. 
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Holocaust, and scores of others have voiced their concerns over the construction of 
yet another Holocaust memorial. Many argued that there is no need for another 
Holocaust memorial in Germany. 
More often than not local initiatives were undertaken to remember Holocaust 
victims. Unfortunately they usually focused not on Jewish life prior to the Holocaust, 
their numerous contributions to science, the arts, society in general, but rather on their 
death in the Holocaust. An entire people and all their contributions past, present, and 
future were virtually eliminated and what most Holocaust memorials contain is the 
death not the life which had been lived. Specifically this marginalization in death, as 
represented in the former concentration camps, focuses only on the death of European 
Jews not on the life that was extinguished. Just as the Nazis kept their genocide 
operations out of sight and away from major metropolitan areas so too are the 
concentration camp memorials. As centers of memory they are marginalized away 
from everyday interaction with them and being that most camps were outside of 
Germany's borders they are literally and figuratively, "out of site, out of mind, and 
hence out of social conscience and memory."6 
The idea for a central memorial began with Lea Rosh, a popular television 
chat-show host.7 Born in the city of Berlin in 1936 she was given the name Edith 
Rosch. David Irving, a staunch critic of Rosh's, posits that she changed her nrune 
when she discovered that the path to a successful career in post-war Germany was to 
6 OlafKuhlke, 331. 
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have Jewish origins. Rosh studied history, sociology, and journalism. Many years In 
1988 a circle of media figures, historians and private individuals decided that 
Germany needed a central Holocaust memorial. After forty years of avoiding a head-
on confrontation with the Holocaust, Lea Rosh and Eberhart Jaeckel founded 
Perspektive Berlin and later the F orderkreis zur Errichtung eines Denkmals far die 
ermordeten Juden Europas, (Foundation for the Building of a Central Holocaust 
Memorial), to bring it back "into mind" and "into sight." This however was only the 
very beginning of what was to become a very long and difficult trek, the culmination 
of which came on June 25, 1999. 
In 1995, at ceremonies marking the fiftieth anniversary of the end of WWII, 
German political leaders along with thousands of others traveled to former Nazi 
concentration camps to remember the former crimes committed during the Nazi era 
and to speak out for human rights in the present. If one was to judge by the number of 
speeches given, attendance at memorial ceremonies, and press accounts, it appeared 
that the Germans' focus on the crimes of the Nazi past in the spring of 1995 was 
greater than at any time since WWII. Thousands viewed Nazism within museums in 
Berlin, Hamburg, Colgne, Kiel, Hannover, and other cities. A new tnuseum on the 
"topography of terror" opened on the site of the former headquarters of the SS in 
Berlin. Even a few of Germany's leading companies, Daimler-Benz, Volkswagen, 
and the Deutsche Bank, hired historians to give a full account of the slave labor 
7 For newly published writing on the memorial see Lea Rosh, Eberhard Jaeckel, and Tilman Fichter, 
Die Juden, das sind duch die anderen Der Streit um ein deutsches Denlcmal, (Bodenheim, 1999), and 
M. von Jeismann, Mahmal Mitte (1999). 
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practices employed by their companies and the profits made off of stolen Jewish 
property.8 
Bundesprasident, Roman Herzog, delivered the central political statement of 
the fiftieth anniversary events. Speaking to representatives of the United States, 
France, Russia, and Britain gathered at the Reichstag Herzog stated that Germany had 
unleashed "the most horrible war there had ever been" and had suffered terribly as a 
result. He warned against dwelling on German suffering, she continued, "today we do 
not need to discuss that. "Today Germans know very well that the Nazi regime was 
responsible for the Holocaust and the whole of Europe's suffering. Herzog continued, 
after 1945 there was no shortage of efforts to minimize or deny the events that 
unfolded during the Third Reich, but "the basic feeling of collective shame, as 
Theodor Heuss put it so well, was there and became clearer with time. "9 
A high point in the extended public debate over how best to remember the 
destruction of the Third Reich came on April 7, 199 5: in an advertisement in one of 
Germany's most important papers, the Franlifurter Allgemeine Zeitung, some three 
hundred prominent German citizens including politicians, journalists, and academics, 
called upon the public to remember May 8 as a day of liberation and destruction. The 
ad referred to the war's end as "the most tragic and questionable paradox for all of 
us." May 1945 brought an end to Nazi terror, but, the ad explained, it also "marked 
the beginning of the terror of the expulsion and a new oppression in the East and the 
8 Ashley Seager, "Some German Firms Highlight WWII Slave Labor Use," Reuter Asia-Pacific 
Business Report, May 1, 1995, 4. 
9 
"Der Bundespdisident zum Kriegsende vor 50 Jahren: Am 8. Mai wurde ein Tor in die Zukunft 
aufgestoi3en, Franlifurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 9, 1995, p. 6. 
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ongtn of the division of our country." The ad exhorted readers to "Gegen das 
Vergessen," guard against forgetting, and made it clear that they should remember 
more than one German past. 10 
On May 9, 1995 Ignatz Bubis, leader of the Central Council of Jews in 
Germany, proposed that either January 20, the date of the W annsee Conference, or 
January 27, the anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau, become the 
German national day of remembrance for the victims of Nazi persecution and 
genocide. 11 A majority voted in the Bundestag on June 1 or the January 27 date. 12 
Speaking in the Bundestag on January 20, 1996, Bundespdisident Herzog stated that 
an ever sharper and more detailed memory of the crimes of the Nazi era was not part 
of the national political recollection of a unified Germany. Metnory, "is in our own 
interest," he said, because it makes learning possible. "Remembrance gives us 
strength, since it helps to keep us from going astray." January 27 was intended as a 
day of remembrance specifically to draw attention to the victims of an ideology "that 
propagated a [doctrine of] 'Nordic master race' and subhumans and denied the right 
of the latter to exist." It was also to remind younger Germans to recognize and resist 
the first signs of intolerance and racism. It was their "collective responsibility," said 
Herzog, to keep memory alive in order to overcome evil and to understand the 
precious nature of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and human dignity. The 
"generation of witnesses to those times" which "drew their conclusions from those 
experiences" was now stepping down from the political stage. Herf affirms that with 
10 
"8. Mai 1945 - Gegen das Yergessen," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 27, 1995, p. 3. 
11 
"Bubis dringt auf Gedenktag ffir die NA-Opfer," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, May 9, 1995, p. 3. 
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the passage of time and earlier generations public memory of the Nazi era became 
more, not less, important for German society and democracy. 
This assertion is affirmed by literature. Shortly after WWII the first "wave" of 
"Allied" novels emerged and tended to dwell on the experience of battle and of life 
on the home front. In Germany these writers consisted of Heinrich Boll, Siegfried 
Lenz, Ingeborg Bachmann, and Gunter Grass. Their writing was full of self-loathing 
and self-doubt. The next "wave" consisted of a handful of survivors, personal 
witnesses such as Primo Levi and Viktor Frank, as well as the unsilenceable Anne 
Frank, who gave back images of what had been nearly hidden in the shadow of war 
and nearly "obliterated from collective memory." 13 By the mid 1990's a younger 
generation of authors, known as the third "wave," had risen to stardom. Within the 
year (1997) Christoph Ransmayer's, The Dog King, Bernhard Schlink's, The Reader, 
Italy's Paolo Maurensig's, The Lueneburg Variation, and the Karnau Tapes by the 
German Marcel Beyer had all been published. These fictitious novels lend credibility 
to the fact that the specter of the Holocaust is moving into the next millennium. 
In 1998 politics of remembering took another tum when Christian Democrat 
Union Chancellor Helmut Kohl was replaced by a "Red-Green" (Social Democrats 
and Green Party) coalition header by Gerhard Schroder. Along with tax reform, 
treatment of immigrants, and unemployment the Holocaust Memorial and mernory of 
the Nazi era became divisive issues in the 1998 chancellor elections. Schroder was 
opposed to the construction of a Holocaust memorial in Berlin. His successful 
12 
"Auschwitz Anniversary to Be German Remembrance Day," Agence France Presse, June 1, 1995. 
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election seemed to suggest that the German public wanted to move away from the 
shadow of WWII unposed on them by Kohl. However, shortly after Schroder's 
victory a fiery debate broke out between Martin Walser, a well-respected novelist, 
and Ignatz Bubis, leader of Germany's Jewish community that was to have a 
profound impact on the policies of Gerhard Schroder. 
After receiving the top prize at the Frankfurt Book Fair, Walser expressed his 
discontent with the "routine of accusations" that he argued had developed against 
Germans. 14 He remarked, "Auschwitz is not suited to becoming a routine threat, a 
tool of intimidation that can be used anytime, the moral stick or merely a compulsory 
exercise." Following this speech many Germans wrote letters to the press, praising 
Walser's articulation of what many felt but were unable to say- that Germans no 
longer wanted to be burdened by a past that they could not remember. On the 60th 
anniversary of Kristallnacht, Bubis declared Walser's words "moral arson." He 
argued that Walser's reference to the Berlin Holocaust Memorial as a "nightmare" 
was unacceptable. 15 This occurred at the same time as a survey was published was 
published by the Forsa Polling Institute. The survey concluded that 31 percent of 
German teenagers could not answer the question: "What was Auschwitz-Birkenau?"16 
Meanwhile growing unemployment, especially in eastern Germany, was leading to a 
rise in neo-Nazism and neo-Nazi crimes. Between 1997 and 1998 in the city of 
13 Kai Maristed, "European Novelists Continue Grappling Anew with Nazi Era," NY Times (November 
23 , 1997). 
14 Diana Moreno, "Echo of the Past: Germany' s Stifling Indecision," Harvard International Review, 
June 1, 1999, vol. 21 , issue 3, p. 9. 
IS Ibid., 10. 
16 Ibid. , 10. 
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Magdeburg, where unemployment hovered around 20 percent, xenophobic crimes 
had increased by 19 percent. 17 Schroder realized that he could no longer avoid the 
issue of the Berlin Holocaust Memorial. 
The year 1999 saw a decision by the German Parliament on the issue of the 
Memorial. In a vote of 314 to 209, with 14 abstentions the design was approved with 
support of Chancellor Schroder's center-left Government. Perhaps there was no 
greater way to end the millennium in Germany than with a decision to construct the 
Berlin Holocaust Memorial. It symbolizes a willingness to engage with the past and 
to learn from it. And draws a clear line in the sand from suppression to ritualization to 
ultimate engagement with the past. Construction of the memorial cannot stop 
xenophobia. However, it can serve to highlight what could happen if it is not 
tempered. Even though we are embarking on a new century the ramifications of the 
total war and mass death still linger and still impact the identity of generations twice 
removed. 
After eleven years of debate, the new German Bundestag voted to build a 
national "Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe" on a prime piece of Berlin real 
estate. Measuring five acres, or two football fields, the local for the proposed 
memorial lies a stone's throw from Hitler's bunker, between the Brandenburger Gate 
and Potsdamer Platz. This decision has had a major impact on the political self-itnage 
of reunified Germany and subsequently dictated the official politics of memory for 
the nation. 
17 Ibid. , 10. 80 
Location, Location, Location: Why Berlin? 
"Just how does a city house the memory of a people no longer at home 
there?" 18 This was the question James E. Young posed to his audience at Humboldt-
UniversiHit in 1997. He was referring to Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum. Young 
characterized the dilemma surrounding the proposed museum as the ''uncanny 
quandary" of Germany trying to invite Jews back into its official past after having 
driven them from it so murderously in the not too distant past: 
Nothing in Berlin's history ever changed the city more than the 
persecution, expulsion, and murder of its own Jewish citizens. This 
change worked inwards, affecting the very heart of the city. 19 
Rudy Koshar has said that "Berlin is the only place where one can live out fully the 
Holocaust neurosis."20 This is true for many reasons. Berlin was the command center, 
the staging area, for Hilter's Nazi regime. It was in Berlin, in the suburb ofWannsee, 
that Hitler's "Final Solution" was launched, and it is Berlin that will forever wear the 
scars of the Holocaust, its loss of it vigorous Jewish life and community. Berlin, once 
again the capital of Germany, sits with a large gaping hole in the middle that many 
believe the new Memorial will fill. 
Prior to 1933 Berlin was home to 170,000 Jews. Today the Jewish population 
of Berlin hovers somewhere around 20,000, mostly due to the large influx of Eastern 
European Jews. During the Nazi regime an entire culture was obliterated, wiped clean 
from the pages of history were a thousand years of Jewish contributions to society. 
18 James E. Young, Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum in Berlin: The Uncanny Arts of Memorial 
Architecture (October 30, 1997) Vorgange anlasslich der Verleihung der Ehrendoktorwarde an Daniel 
Libeskind. 
81 
Theodor Adorno avowed that after Auschwitz there must be no more poetry.21 What 
kind of capital city can Berlin be after Hitler? 
To say that Holocaust memorials are bountiful in the city of Berlin would be 
an understatement. Most memorials can be found in obvious locations, like the 
courtyard of the Jewish Community Center, or in one of the busy shopping districts in 
western Berlin.22 There is of course the Neue Wache, New Guardhouse, rededicated 
in 1993 by Kohl as the new "Central Memorial to the Victims of War and Tyranny," 
which has its own set conceptual problems. Others, perhaps summoning the most 
emotional impact, are situated in more out-of-the-way locales. These obscure 
memorials when stumbled upon by the casual observer offer an unexpected pull 
toward memory. Small, neighborhood monuments usually provide a very personal 
touch incorporated within them, remembering an individual or family that once lived 
there. So if memorials like these abound why does Berlin need another one, 
especially one costing millions of Deutschmark? Berlin needs another memorial 
because Germany, not the city, needs one. The power of place, Berlin, will p1ake the 
Nazi past vivid, comprehensible, and inextricable from the lives of today's 
Germans.23 
The chosen site for the Berlin Memorial is located between the Brandenburg 
Gate and Potsdamer Platz. The location itselfhas a great deal of history attached to it 
20 Rudy Koshar, 269. 
21 Quoted in The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape, by Brian 
Ladd (Chicago: The university of Chicago Press, 1997) 167. 
22 In front of the KaDeWe department store and at Kaiser-Wilhelm-Platz 
23 Ladd, 172. 
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and understanding that helps explain why there is so much dissent over the location of 
the Holocaust memorial. In the 1920's Potsdamer Platz was known as Europe's 
busiest junction and was an exciting place for leisure and entertainment with the 
legendary Haus Vaterland and Cafe Josty along with numerous other bars, cafes and 
posh hotels. During WWII the square suffered extensive damage. During the Cold 
War Potsdamer Platz became the city's black market center because it was where the 
three sectors, British, American, and Soviet, met. The wide border zone on the East 
side of the Wall was a no- man's-land and no one was interested in the area on the 
West side because it was too close to the Wall. The only attraction in Potdamer Platz 
after WWII was an observation deck where tourists in the West went to peer over into 
East Berlin. 
However, once the Wall collapsed a unique opportunity became available to 
investors: where in the world could one build so extensively right in the middle of a 
major metropolitan city? Within two years DaimlerChrysler had erected nineteen 
buildings at a cost of around two billion Deutschmarks. Not far behind was Sony who 
had just as quickly thrown-up eight buildings for around seventy million. From the 
mid-1990's thousands of visitors watched the construction progress, and they have 
not stopped coming. Potsdamer Platz boasts the highest concentration of cinemas in 
Germany and one can shop and eat in three stories of air-conditioned comfort the 
whole year round. One can also get a glimpse of the city as a whole from 90 meters 
up in the Potsdamer Platz No. 1 Building. The city building director, Hans Stimmann, 
in writing about the development of Potsdamer Platz, assured Berliners that all the 
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gleaming new buildings did not mean that the city was trying to suppress memories of 
Nazi terror- as its approval of the Holocaust metnorial showed.24 
In 1998 Berlin city employees acknowledged that they had discovered a 
bunker used by Hitler's propaganda chief, Josef Goebbels. The bunker butted right up 
against the 215,000 square-foot site for the proposed Holocaust memorial. This 
discovery rekindled the debate about whether the proposed location for the Holocaust 
memorial atop Nazi ruins was appropriate. 25 
The location of something is an important way in which to examtne the 
relative importance of the ceremonial and educational functions of a type of place. If 
the official German Holocaust Memorial were to have been located in Munich rather 
than Berlin it would have translated an entirely different meaning. A national 
memorial representing exclusively the murdered Jews, located in the capital, should 
carry the self-image of a whole nation having targeted this ethnic and religious group, 
and represent this self-interpretation of one's national history to the nation and the 
global community. Places of memory contain the maximum of meaning with the 
fewest amount of signs. 
Difference of Opinion? 
Centuries ago comtnemoration was more straightforward. Public art was 
commissioned by kings, queens, popes and dukes, who answered to no one. 
Democracy and modernity have altered all that. Now consensus is sought. In an effort 
24 Foyer: Magazin der Senatsverwaltungfar Bau - und Wohnungswesen , 4, no. 2 (June 1994): 26, 
quoted in Brian Ladd The Ghosts of Berlin, 170. 
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to appease even the smallest of voices all sides to any memory-work are heard, which 
leads to our case in point, the decade long indecision over Berlin's Holocaust 
memorial. Essentially there are three sides to this argument: the citizens, the city 
planners, and the government. 
As Kirk V an1edoe, curator at the Museum of Modem Art, points out "art has 
the capacity to transcend history that history doesn't have by itself."26 This perhaps is 
why the form which the monument would take is so problematic for so many. 
Vamedoe adds that great art causes people to want to return to it long after the events 
which prompted the artist to make the work join 1066 and 1848 as dry facts in high 
school textbooks. This by far is the greatest fear: that the Nazi era will recede into the 
footnotes of history and people will no longer feel compelled to put a voice to their 
innermost struggles over n1eaning and memory. There is overwhelming anxiety that 
the Holocaust memorial in Berlin, whatever form it will ultimately take, will be 
visited by future generations of Gem1an youth who will deposit their feelings at the 
foot of the memorial and then just as briskly tum on their heels and leave their 
reflections on the murdered Jews there, not to be thought of again until the next 
school organized bus trip. 
This, I argue, is the fear in Germany today and the largest obstacle blocking 
completion of the tnemorial: that the memorial will serve as the final commentary on 
Holocaust memory. Many feel that the new reunified Germany is going to be able to 
successfully put the Holocaust and all its atrocities behind it with the construction of 
25 Alan Cowell, The New York Times (February 5, 1998). 
26 Kirk Varnedoe, in Michael Kimmelman "Turning Memory into Travesty," New York Times (March 
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this new national memorial. Still others, particularly intellectuals and politicians, say 
that a monument such as this one would not kindle memory but rather take the place 
of it. 
As I have suggested, and as one can probably imagine, when the idea for a 
central memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe was initiated there was a large 
outpouring of both approval and dissent. The largest and most vehement dissension 
came to be over the two highly important points. The design of the 1nen1orial and how 
victims were to be represented within it. Would only Jews be remembered or other 
members of the European community that had been victims of the Third Reich be 
included as well? 
Memory Meets Politics27 
One of the first people to voice their concern was Eberhard Diepgen, the then 
conservative mayor of Berlin. Diepgen spoke out saying that the large memorial was 
too "monumental" and would tum Berlin into a "city of mourning. "28 Others, 
primarily intellectuals, fear that the memorial will serve as a "final solution" and end 
to remembering rather than a place for remembrance and reconciliation. There was a 
widely held concern that the memorial was not being built for Germans but rather for 
foreign dignitaries and would simply become a site for wreaths and ceremonial 
flourishes. Giinter Grass questioned if it would even be possible to represent the 
atrocities of the Holocaust. 
4, 2001 ). Mr. V amedoe is a curator for the Museum of Modem Art. 
27 The subtitle is taken from James E. Young's work At Memory's Edge, 216. 
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The issue of the memorial became a political pawn almost from the beginning. 
The 1998 national elections the opposition Social Democrat candidate, Gerhard 
Schroeder, opposed the monument in Berlin because he believed it would not 
increase awareness and rernembrance. With that Schroeder's cultural czar, Michael 
Naumann, threw caution to the wind and injected a hitherto taboo topic into the 
campaign: should Germany abandon its project to build a huge memorial to the 
Holocaust?29 Naumann predicted that Mr. Kohl's plans for a huge memorial would 
represent "a memorial for memory, a suspension of guilt in art." Naumann argued 
that the most appropriate place for a Holocaust memorial was at the former 
concentration camps where the sheer shock would evoke more psychological working 
through rather than a mere moment of reflection. Schroeder's successful campaign 
seemed to suggest that the German public had had enough and wanted to move away 
from the shadows of WWII. 
A survey conducted by the Forsa Polling Institute found 31 percent of German 
teenagers could not answer the question, "What was Auschwitz-Birkenau?" Why was 
this so alarming? Perhaps because within another generation this percentage could be 
even higher. With each passing day we loose more and more of those who actually 
lived through the Holocaust. With each passing day the tnemory of it recedes further 
into the epochs of time. Ultimately even Schroder had to conclude that he could no 
28 BBC News "Bundestag Approves Holocaust Memorial" (Friday, June 25, 1999) 
29 Alan Cowell, "An Opponent of Kohl puts Taboo Topic into Election," 
(Th e New York Times, July 26, 1998). 
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longer avoid the prospect of the Berlin Holocaust Memorial, it must be built. 30 
The construction of the Monument has taken on more meaning than I think 
anyone could have ever anticipated. It appears that with the monument comes an 
entirely new catharsis of memory. The Monument is inextricably linked to politics 
and place. Within its core lies the ability for a new Germany to unite and confront 
their shared past. 
30 Diana Moreno, "Echo of the Past," (Harvard International Review, June 1, 1999) Vol. 21 , Issue 3, p 
9. 
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IV 
The Monument 
A central memorial is the fundamentally wrong way to mark the Holocaust! 1 
-Die Zeit 
Away with the monuments! 2 
-Nietzsche 
In the new federal government quarter of the new German capital of Berlin a 
plot of land was allocated for the memorial. An impressive, 15 million Mark ($1 0 
million) budget was set and a groundbreaking ceremony scheduled. The only thing 
missing was a design for the memorial. At this point the discussion seemed to stall. 
Organizers began by assembling a series of forums in Berlin which brought together 
70 historians, artists, politicians and community and religious leaders to address why 
it was necessary to have a memorial, how it should look, and where it should stand. 
Several panelists pointed toward the Vietnam Memorial in Washington and Vienna's 
Holocaust memorial as projects which had succeeded in helping countries to heal 
their historical wounds. Ultimately the planners hoped that the memorial in Berlin 
could serve as the appropriate legacy of the generation that accepted the need to 
honor the memory of those who died in the Holocaust. This generation is comprised 
of the grandchild of the perpetrator generation. Peter Radunski, Berlin's Culture 
Senator, speaking at the Berlin forum noted that "Future generations may see things 
in a different way, but they should and will see how our generation tried to deal with 
the need to remember six million murdered European Jews. "3 A society that is now 
1 Die Zeit (19 Marz 1998) 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, trans. Adrian Collins (New York: Macmillan, 
1985), 14-17. 
3 Bradley R. Smith, Germany Agonizes Over Memorial to Jews, The Revisionist (January 28, 1997) 
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two generations removed from the Nazi era may have felt the pull to establish a 
memorial more strong! y than prior generations because of their very distance from the 
event. Jiirgen Habermas asks, "Do we make the critical memory of Auschwitz ... an 
explicit component of our political self understanding?'A However, after the 
generation of Radunski passes there will be no more living memory of the Nazi 
period and that just may be the driving force behind the impetus to have this 
memorial completed. "Already three-quarters of the people in this country were born 
after the Second World War. "5 The monument thus has been depicted as the antidote 
for the flawed memorialization of previous commemorations which avoided a full 
reckoning with the crimes of the Nazi era. Memory must be created for the next 
generation, not simply catalogued and stored. It was on this note that the proceedings 
to find that appropriate legacy for which to define "official" German Holocaust 
memory began. The monument would "speak" as part of the discourse of 
remembrance or active engagement and identity. 
Minima/ism in Memorials: Friend or Foe? 
The monument has undergone a radical transformation over the course of the 
twentieth century. The monument is now the intersection between public art and 
political memory. It is called on to do double duty as it reflects the aesthetic and 
political revolutions of the century. The result has been a metamorphosis of the 
monument from one of heroic, self-aggrandizing to the anti-heroic and self-effacing 
"marking the national ambivalence and uncertainty of late twentieth century post-
4 Jiirgen Habermas, "Der Zeigefinger. Die Deutschen und ihr Denkmal," Die Zeit (March 31, 1999). 
5 Alan Cowell, "Bleak Debate in Berlin on the Holocaust Memorial," New York Times (January 11 , 
1997). 
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modemism."6 The new monuments attempt to return the burden of memory to visitors 
themselves by forcing visitors into an active role. The most important space for the 
artists which create these monuments is the space above or below, but the space 
between the memorial and the viewer. Even more so the space between the viewer 
and his own memory: the place of the memorial in the viewer's mind, heart, and 
conscience. 
We have become uncomfortable with literal representation in memorial art. 
Perhaps this has to do with the fact that encapsulated within minimalist memorial 
work is a sense of timelessness. These artists are attempting to build into these 
memorials the capacity for changing memory. Each new generation will find its own 
significance in the past. "The past has a claim not just on us, but on the future."7 
Minimalism, as an art movement, came to being in the late 1950's. Artists 
such as Frank Stella began to tum away from the "gestural" art of the previous 
generation. The Minimalist movement really flourished in the 1960's and '70s with 
Donald Judd, Dan Flavin, Carl Andre, Sol LeWitt, and Robert Morris becoming the 
movement's most important innovators.8 
One usually thinks of art as representing an aspect of the real world (a 
landscape, a person, or an item); or reflecting an experience such as an emotion or 
feeling. With minimalism however, no attempt is made to represent an outside reality, 
the artist wants the viewer to respond only to what is in front of them. The medium, 
or material from which it is made, and the form of the work is the reality. Minimal ism 
is characterized by single or repeated geometric forms. Is usually takes the form of a 
6 Young, "Memory and Counter-Memory," 
7 Catesby Leigh, Weekly Standard Volume 6, Number 24 (March 5, 2001) 
8 For notes on Minimalism as a movement, see Barbara Reise, Minima/ism as a Style Label. 
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sculpture or installation though there are a number of Minimalist painters as well. 
There is a deliberate lack of expression in Minimalist art. Tropes of minimalist 
interior design include pale wood, white walls, understatement not ostentation. 
Minimalist memorial art directly engages with the space it occupies and encourages 
the viewer to be conscious of the space involved. It relies on simple elements- falling 
water, smooth stone, hushed spaces, the contrast between above ground and 
underground - to evoke emotions.9 Minimalist artists believe that they are creating 
the possibility for a more direct and pure relationship between the viewer and the 
work, in this case, less is more. Curator for Tate Gallery, Simon Wilson, speaking 
with the Guardian (I Dec 2001) said of Minimalist art: 
Order; it is extremely ordered; purity, because it is perfectly stripped 
down. But, above all, truth because it doesn't pretend to be anything 
else. And, like Shelley says, truth is beauty and beauty is truth. 10 
With this said minimalist memorial art refuses to comment upon what those emotions 
are which it evokes. 
Michael Kimmelman, for the New York Times, wrote that "Minimalism, of 
all improbable art movements of the last 50 years, [has] become the unofficial 
language of memorial art." 11 From Berlin to Oklahoma City, Kimmelman says, 
deciding how a memorial is to look has met with unprecedented angst. Memorial ali 
has definitely seen a change over the last century, what used to be great men sitting 
astride horses with valiant looks on their faces has been replaced with plain walls and 
9 Young, "Memory and Counter-Memory: The End of the Monument in Germany," Harvard Design 
Magazine (Fall 1999) Number 9, 1-10. 
1
° From the web site for Tate Gallery. 
11 Michael Kimmelman, "Out ofMinimalism, Monuments to Memory," New York Times (January 12, 
2002). 
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boxes. 12 The modem art form of Minimalism which is characterized by "less is more" 
has somehow won over the hearts of a vast amount of the population. The term 
minimalism has become a household word due to the huge influx of home 
improvement and design shows that proliferate today' s cable networks. It appears, 
according to Kimmelman, that those very blank slates and bare walls are where we 
now project our "deepest commonly held feelings." 13 
The most obvious example of this form of art is Maya Lin's Vietnam 
memorial in Washington, D.C., where visitor's faces are reflected off the black 
granite like mirrors in order that one may "see yourself reflected in the names.' The 
grid of chairs in Oklahoma City, representing the victims of the terrorist bombing 
there, is another and Rachel Whiteread's Holocaust memorial in Vienna, Austria, a 
big eggshell-colored box made to resemble an inside-out room with shelves of books, 
is yet another. So it should not come as any great surprise to find that the Berlin 
Holocaust memorial's second selection was of the Minimalist genre. 
Can a space that is filled by a completely non-representational monument 
work as a spur to remember? Is this "blankness" the appropriate medium for 
Holocaust remembrance in Germany? I would caution the observer because reflection 
may be stimulated by a Minimalist memorial but what the "content" is of that 
reflection one does not know. Minimalist memorials are so far removed from what a 
memorial is, a gravestone, that perhaps they are asking too much of the observer. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
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The First Competition 
It was 1994 before an international competition was organized and designs 
were requested for Germany's national "Memorial for the Murdered Jews of 
Europe." 14 The competition's guidelines were nondescript and simply advised 
participants that they had five acres at their disposal and that the memorial was for the 
Jews killed during the Holocaust; there were no other specifics given. From around 
the world designs poured in until by the close of the competition some 528 designs 
had been offered for consideration. 
As one may guess, the designs ran the gamut in taste and aesthetic 
sensibilities, from high modern to low kitsch, and from architectural to the 
conceptual. There were beautiful ideas with breathtaking dimensions, such as Dani 
Karavan's proposed field of yellow flowers laid out in the shape of the Star of David, 
and some that were simply grotesque. Horst Hoheisel proposed that the 
Brandenburger Gate be blown up, the remains ground into dust, scattered over the 
memorial "area," and then the entire field covered with granite plates. Within his 
proposal Hoheisel asked: How better to remember a destroyed people than with a 
destroyed monument? Hoheisel's work was considered too outrageous for the 
German government to ever except. 
Perhaps the most offensive proposal was a plan for a gigantic Ferris wheel in 
which the amusement park swinging chairs would be replaced by the type of railway 
14 For a record of this competition, see Denkmalfur die ermordeten Juden Europas: 
Kurzdokumentation (Berlin: Senatsverwaltung fur Bau - und Wohnungswesen, 1995), For a collection 
of essays arguing against building this monument , seeDer Wettbewerb fur das "DenA:mal fur die 
ermordeten Juden Europas": Eine Streitschrift (Berlin, 1995). 
94 
cattle cars that transported the Jews to their deaths. 15 There were various proposals for 
obelisks that were round, square, and triangular in shape, and numerous variations on 
gardens of stone, broken hearts, and Stars of David. Renata Stih and Frieder Schneck 
proposed a series of bus stops whereby coaches would take visitors to the sites of 
actual destruction throughout Berlin, Germany, and Europe. The variance in ideas 
was vast, the task of deciding the most appropriate even greater. 
The panel of judges that was assembled for the first competition contained 
fifteen members. There were laypeople and experts all appointed by the three 
sponsoring agencies involved, the Bundestag, the Berlin Senate, and the original 
citizen's group created by Lea Rosh. Though the deliberations over the monun1ent 
were not held in a public forum there is reported to have been very little consensus 
amongst the organizers. Many of the jurors told of heated debate particular! y between 
the experts and the lay people. The citizens' group resented the experts, who they 
regarded as having elitist taste with an affinity for minimalist design: "This is not a 
playground for artists and their self-absorbed fantasies," Lea Rosh is reported to have 
reminded her colleagues on the committee. 16 The experts, in typical highbrow 
fashion, snubbed their noses at what they considered to be the kitsch and 
emotionalism of the lay members, and the Bundestag's appointees "glanced anxiously 
at their watches as the right political moment seemed to be ticking away." 17 As with 
any project where people from different backgrounds and agendas are called upon to 
come to a consensus the air was rife with animosity and contention. That the entire 
world waited to see how Germans would choose to "officially" commemorate their 
15 
"Vom Mahnmal zum Wahnmal," Der Spiege/35 (1998) 
16 Young, At Memory 's Edge, 189. 
17 Ibid. ,189. 
95 
misdeed added to the pressure to make a decision and forced the committee into a 
decision I don't believe they were prepared or ready to make. 
In March 1995 a winner was announced. However this so called "decision" 
was merely a tactic of delay, for the committee had not picked one winner but two 
with eight other proposals being considered as finalists. Of the two winners only one 
would be built with elements of the other incorporated into it. The jury had badly 
misrepresented themselves to the rest of the world for their choice was only cloaked 
as a decision. It appeared to the world at large that they had decided not to decide 
which further proved that Germany had a major problem with it's collective 
remembrance of the Nazi past. It was not that the jurors didn't want to decide or that 
they didn't want a memorial to be built. They did, however, suffer what I believe to 
be a crisis of confidence. They really did not know what they wanted before the 
competition began, therefore they didn't know exactly what they were looking for in 
a winner. If one revisits the guidelines for the first competition the entrants were 
simply given the dimensions of the plot and not much else. 
The "semi-finalist" winner, Berlin architect Christine Jackob-Marks', 
proposed building a gargantuan, twenty-three-foot thick concrete gravestone in the 
shape of a three-hundred-foot square, titled at an angle running from six feet high at 
one end to twenty-five feet high at the other. It was to be engraved with the 
recoverable names of 4.5 million murdered Jews, and in the Jewish tradition of 
leaving small stones at a gravesite to mark the mourner's visit, it was to have some 
eighteen boulders from Masada in Israel scattered over its surface. The design seemed 
to contain the elements of sentimentalism, and remembrance which the jury, and 
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Germany as a whole, were looking for. However, the design was the winning design 
for only a few hours before it was recalled by Chancellor Kohl , who criticized it as 
being "too big and undignified." 18 
What the jury had failed to consider, but was quickly brought to their 
attention, was the symbolism involved with Masada. According to the early Jewish 
historian Josephus, Mas ada was the stronghold against the Romans at the end of the 
Jewish revolt of 66-73 C.E. and also the site of a collective suicide of Jews that 
prevented the Romans from taking them as slaves. 19 A German national Holocaust 
memorial with Jewish self-sacrifice as part of its theme would just not do. An 
avalanche of artistic, intellectual, and editorial criticism erupted that decried the 
monument as too big, too heavy-handed, too divisive, and finally just too German: a 
German national Holocaust memorial with Jewish self-sacrifice as part of its theme? 
The leader of Germany's Jewish community, Ignatz Bubis, hated it and told 
Chancellor Kohl that the winning design was simply unacceptable. Kohl, exasperated 
with the whole thing, and fearing that it would cast a permanent funerary shadow 
over the restored capital, withdrew the government's support?0 Meanwhile all 528 
designs were put on display at Berlin's Stadtratshaus. 
Henryk Broder, writing for Der Spiegel, described the exhibition of the 528 as 
a "quarry [where] anthropologists, psychologist, and behaviorists could exmnine the 
condition of a confused nation wanting to create a monument to its victims in order to 
18 Ibid. , 190. 
19 Micheal Wise, "Totem and Taboo: The New Berlin Struggles to Build a Holocaust Memorial" 
Lingua Franca, (December/January 1999). 
20 Michael Wise, "Totem and Taboo ... " 
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purify itself."21 James E. Young wrote in response to the competition: "Good ... Better 
a thousand years of Holocaust memorial competitions and exhibitions in Germany 
than any single 'final solution' to Germany's memorial problem .. .If the aim is to 
remember for perpetuity that this great nation once murdered nearly six million 
human beings solely for having been Jew, then this monument must remru.n 
uncompleted and unbuilt, an unfinishable memorial process."22 Within a matter of 
weeks after the first competition an entire volume was produced filled with objections 
of some three dozen critics, artists, and intellectuals.23 
Another year of stormy debate ensued over whether another competition 
should be called, another site should be chosen, or whether the previous winners 
should be invited to refine their proposals. From January to April 1997 a series of 
public colloquia were held; invited were a number of distinguished artists, historians, 
critics, and curators. Jiirgen Kocka, Michael Sturmer, Christian Meier, are just some 
of those to participate. These men and women were assembled to discuss how the 
present designs might be modified to suit the commission's desires. Designs would 
come via invitation only and the jury was much smaller and more expert. 
The first two colloquia held in January and March roused considerable public 
interest, but the mood amongst the organizers was acrimonious at best. Lea Rosh 
insisted that the "five aims" of the project retnain inviolable: (1) this would be a 
memorial only to Europe' s murdered Jews; (2) ground would be broken for it on 27 
January 1999, Germany's newly designated "Holocaust Remembrance Day" marked 
21 Henryk Broder, Der Spiegel "Deutschmeister des Trauens," 222. 
22 Young, At Memmy 's Edge, 191. 
23 James Young, "Gegen das Denkmal, fiir Erinnerung," in Der Wettbewerbfilr "Das Denkmalfilr die 
ermordeten Juden Europas: Eine Streitschrift, (Berlin: verlag der Kunst/Neue Gesellschaft fiir 
Bildende Kunst) 1995. 
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to coincide with the liberation of Auschwitz in 1945; (3) its location would be the 
five-acre site of the Ministerial Gardens, between the Brandenburg Gate and 
Potsdamer Platz; ( 4) the nine finalists ' teams from the 1995 competition would be 
invited to revise their designs and concepts after incorporating suggestions and 
criticism from the present colloquia; and (5) the winning design would be chosen 
from the revised designs of the original nine finalists. 24 Not only did the designs 
continue to come under attack but it appeared that the very aims of the project were 
being called strongly into question. 
Among the speakers at the first colloquium was historian Jfirgen Kocka, who 
suggested that although there was clearly a need for a memorial to Europe' s murdered 
Jews, the need for a memorial to encompass the memory of Nazis ' other victims was 
just as clear. Other speakers, such as Michael Stiirmer, questioned the site itself, 
"whether its gargantuan dimensions somehow invited precisely the kind of 
monumentality that had already been rejected."25 Other critics focused more narrowly 
on the first colloquium's theme: "Why There Should Be a Holocaust Metnorial in 
Berlin," and concluded that with authentic sites of destruction scattered over Berlin 
there shouldn't be a central memorial at all. Berlin Senate Speaker Peter Randunski 
who had been appointed to convene the proceedings, appeared indifferent to this 
dissent, he contended that since these criticisms had no place on the agenda, they 
need not be addressed here, which led them to their third and final colloquium 
scheduled for April. 
24 From Radunski 's "Opening Remarks" to the First Colloquium on Berlin' s Memorial to the 
Murdered Jews of Europe, (January 11 , 1997). 
25 Young, At Memory's Edge, 192. 
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Lea Rosh opened the final meeting with a bitter attack on what she called the 
"leftist intellectual establishment" responsible for undermining both the process and 
memory of Europe's murdered Jews. Her words served to antagonize the critics and 
solidified the positions of the memorial's opponents, which included some rather elite 
historians, writers, and cultural critics such as Reinhart Koselleck, Julius Schoep 
Solomon Kom, Stefanie Endlich, Christian Meier, and eventually Gfulter Grass and 
Peter Schneider. 
James E. Young offered some closing remarks at the third and final 
colloquium. He says in his work At Memory's Edge that he discarded his prepared 
lecture and instead began by telling the story of other fraught memorial processes in 
Israel and the United States: the furious debate in Israel's Knesset surrounding the 
day of remembrance there, and the memorial "paralysis" in New York, Los Angeles 
and Washington, D.C. All of these debates had ultimately resulted in completed 
memorials, and all of them were contested. "I could almost hear the collective sigh of 
relief," Young says, as he continued to validate the German's position.26 Young told 
his audience that they may have failed to produce a monument [referring to the first 
competition], ''but if you count the sheer number of design-hours that 528 teams of 
artists and architects have already devoted to the me1norial, it's clear that your 
process has already generated more individual memory-work then a finished 
monument will inspire in its first ten years." With the audience left to chew on 
Young's words Peter Randunski assembled a jury for another competition. 
26 Young, 193. 
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The Second Competition 
In 1997 the German government announced a second competition in which 
some fundamental changes were made. First, the panel was smaller only five men 
would be deciding the final design, and it also contained more experts. The directors 
of the German Historical Museum in Berlin and of the Museum of Contemporary Art 
in Bonn, Christoph Stoezel and Dieter Ronte, were asked to participate. One of 
Germany's most eminent art historians Werner Hofmann and Berlin architect, Josef 
Paul Kleihues, were asked to participate as well. Rounding out the top five was an 
unusual choice, for he was both a foreigner and a Jew. This fifth candidate was James 
E. Young a professor of English and Judaic studies at the University of Massachusetts 
at Amherst. Kleihues said of Young, "he was the most important person," because of 
his religion, "he had an entirely different legitimacy."27 Young agrees that his 
selection as a juror owes something to the fact that "whenever they [Germans] try to 
make any kind of decision with a Jewish component, the Germans are paralyzed."28 
This was demonstrated by the first memorial competition. 
In an effort to avoid a third memorial competition and global embarrasstnent 
the Findungskommission for Berlin's "Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe" 
agreed to write a precise conceptual plan for the memorial. This was perhaps the 
fundamental flaw in the first competition, there was no clear direction given to tho e 
wishing to enter the competition. Rather the artists and architects were left to flounder 
in a sea of "formal, conceptual, and political ambiguities."29 To make the project aims 
more concise the jury began by specifying (1) that the memorial would not be an 
27 Michael Wise, "Totem and Taboo,' 39. 
28 Ibid. , 39. 
29 Young, 197. 
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attempt to replace the nation' s other memorial sites (2) this memorial would not 
speak for Nazis ' other victims but may, in fact, necessitate further memorials to them 
and (3) the memorial will not paper over the difficult questions driving Germany's 
memorial debate, but instead should reflect the terms of that debate: "the 
insufficiency of memorials, the contemporary generation' s skeptical view of official 
memory and its self-aggrandizing ways."30 
In this way the Findungskommission described a concept of memorialization 
which they thought befit a memorial in Berlin as opposed to the first competition' s 
nondescript guidelines, which simply advised participants that they had five acr at 
their disposal and that the memorial was for the Jews killed during the Holocaust. 
They did not establish an exact form that it should take, but they did provide some 
very much needed parameters. Ultimately they envisioned the new entrants 
submitting designs that would include: a clear definition of the Holocaust and its 
significance, address Nazi Germany's role as perpetrator, and reunified Germany' s 
role as rememberer, portray the contemporary generation ' s relationship to Holocaust 
memory, and the aesthetic debate swirling around the memorial itself: 
Instead of providing answers, we asked questions: What are the 
national reasons for remembrance? Are they redemptory, part of a 
mourning process, pedagogical, self-aggrandizing, or inspiration 
against contemporary xenophobia? To what national and social ends 
will this memorial be built? Just how compensatory a gesture will it 
be? How artiredemptory can it be? Will it be a place for Jews to mourn 
lost Jews, a place for Germans to mourn lost Jews, or a place for Jews 
to remember what Germans once did to them? These questions must 
be made part of the memorial process ... so let them be asked by the 
artists in their designs, even if they cannot finally be answered. 31 
30 Ibid. , 197. 
31 Ibid. , 197 
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The jury was also concerned over another issue also shared by the tnemorials 
opponents. Should the memorial be a contemplative site only, or pedagogically 
inclined as well ?32 
Not only had the jury been pared down and a concept established but so too 
had the number of invited entrants. The nine finalists of the 1995 competition and to a 
dozen or so other world-class artists and architects were asked to submit new designs. 
Out of those initial entrants only twenty-five were chosen to submit a sketch and 
conceptual design. Among those who had initially accepted the jury's invitation were 
architects Peter Eisenman, Jochen Gerz, Rebecca Hom, Dani Karavan Daniel 
Libeskind, California light artist James Turrell and sculptors Richard Serra and 
Rachel Whiteread. James Turrell was not heard from again, and Racheal Whiteread 
withdrew, explaining that her Vienna memorial was still in flux and she didn ' t think 
she could stomach a similarly fraught contest in Berlin. The Berlin Senate publicly 
announced the list, stating that the Findungskommission would be selecting a winning 
design by November 1997 and ground would be broken in January 1999 to coincide 
with the return of Germany's capital to Berlin and Germany's Holocaust 
remembrance day. Unfortunately this is not exactly how the story unfolded. 
The search committee reviewed all nineteen designs, compiled a list of the 
eight strongest proposals and invited the artists to present their work to the jury and 
organizers in November 1997. Once again the designs ran the gamut of creativity and 
meaning. Markus Lupertz's design of a conciliatory figure of the biblical matriarch 
Rachel and Rebecca Hom's design of ash encased behind a glass cylindrical wall 
descending into the ground, though both well intended, may have given mixed 
messages. Dani Karavan's yellow flower garden in the shape of a Jewish star was 
determined to be a badge of shame in Jewish eyes and therefore not an appropriate 
memorial to the victims. A collaboration from Schiltach, in southern Germany, 
proposed leaving the site entirely vacant, except for the placement of four large 
32 
"Yom Mahnmal zum Wahnmal," Der Spiegel Vol. 35 1998. 
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billboards along each of its sides. These would then be inscribed with the following 
text: 
Between 1933 and 1945 more than six million 
European Jews were murdered. 
The children and grandchildren of the 
perpetrators wanted to build a monument 
here to the victims. This attempt failed. Berlin 1997. 
Another proposal would have turned a short strip of the Autobahn into a penitential 
path. One kilometer of the eleven-thousand-kilometer national highway network - a 
public work project initiated under the Nazi regime - would have been repaved with 
large, cobblestones. This project of Rudolf Herz and Reinhard Matz would have 
required motorists to slow down to a crawl on a highway that knows no speed limits. 
A large overhead road sign that said MONUMENT TO THE MURDERED JEWS OF 
EUROPE would have proclaimed the entrance. Another entry by J ochen Gerz called 
for creating a vast plaza studded with thirty-nine pillars of stainless steel and 
illuminated with the word "Why?" in the various languages spoken by the persecuted 
Jews. Visitors would answer the question on computerized screens at various 
podiums throughout the instillation.33 
Daniel Libeskind, the architect of the Jewish Museum in Berlin, delivered a 
lecture along with James E. Young and Christina von Braun at the Hun1boldt-
UniversiHit im Berlin. The lecture was given on the occasion of the presentation of his 
honorary doctorate. In his address, Beyond the Wall, 34 he discussed architecture and 
the fact that it's undergoing an amnesia. He posits that architecture itself is struggling 
to remember the past what with the countermonument and deconstructionalist 
33 For an insightful summary of the entire process up to September 1998, see Wise, "Totem and 
Taboo," 38-46. 
34 Daniel Libeskind, "Beyond the Wall," Vortdige anHi~lich der Verleihung der Ehrendoktorwiirde an 
Daniel Libeskind (October 30, 1997). 
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movements. Nothing, not even architecture, remains the same. To illuminate this fact 
Libeskind describes the most difficult personal decision he had made in a long time 
which was the decision to enter the competition for the Memorial to the Murdered 
Jews of Europe. He describes it as an unprecedented task: a Memorial for the world s 
biggest crime: the murder of 3% German Jews and 97% European Jews. In order for 
Libeskind to "do" the monument he says he had to reinvent himself. He didn' t think 
of himself as someone doing it for the Germans, or instead of the Germans· nor as an 
architect of just another nationality doing a German project, but rather Libeskind said 
he had to think of himself as someone who has no single identity; himself a product 
of the Holocaust era. For Libeskind the Holocaust touched the entire world not simply 
the Jews and Germans. Humanity in general has suffered for the evil which could not 
be contained and to involve oneself in a competition for an appropriate memorial to 
those murdered would require a global view of the event. To view it simply as an 
event in German history and only consider the loses to Germany and the Jewish 
community would not be sufficient. 
Ultimately it was the design of Peter Eisenman and Richard Serra that was 
chosen. "He [Peter Eisenman] wanted to 'do something that was not either kitsch or 
nostalgia or representational. I hated Schindler's List, ' he says. "I hated any of these 
things that attempt to sort of make a theme park out of the Holocaust. .. "35 So how 
does an architect go about depicting one of the most inexplicable episodes in world 
history? Peter Eisenman' s answer to this question is simple; he plans to simply 
"unrationalize" it. 
35 Simon Houpt, "Building a Different View of Memory," Toronto Globe and Mail, (7 February 2001). 
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His final design consists of 2, 700 grey concrete pillars or standing stones, 
spread over an area of two football fields. Each pillar averages 5.5 meters in height 
and bear no inscription, no words of explanation. " It is a field of pillars that attempts 
to decontextualize the Holocaust, in the sense of trying to see it as a cut in the history 
of Germany," explains Eisenman, "not to try and locate it, not to try an make it a 
thing of nostalgia, not to try and make it be able to be rationalized but to be able to 
be unrationalized. "36 
Most Holocaust memorials, Jerusalem's Yad Vashem and Washington' s 
Holocaust Museum included, provide the visitor with scores of facts figures 
photographs, artworks, and personal stories. They stand as testaments to the 
individuals who perished. Visiting these sites can be emotionally draining and 
frequently cathartic. Eisenman, in his design, went in the opposite direction, no 
nostalgia, no representation, and no theme park draw. 
I'm hoping that this monument will establish a different view of 
memory, a different view of monument, because it doesn't speak, he 
continues. The city speaks: You look at that building, it speaks. Most 
graves have names on them, most memorials have names. This is an 
absolutely blank field. Furthermore, it is a field that people must 
experience on their own, as there will be less than one meter of space 
between each stone. The whole idea is, What does it feel like to be 
alone in space? What it is to be without a goal. . . no beginning, no end, 
no direction?37 
Eisenman explains that the reason behind the controversy over his project is its scale 
its sheer dimension. He suggests that "had it been the weeping Burghers of Calais38 
36 Ibid. 
37 Simon Houpt, Toronto Globe and Mail "Building a Different View of Memory," (7 February 2001) 
38 This is a reference to Rodin's work commemorating an event in the Hundreds Year War between 
England and France whereby six elite citizens of the city of Calais voluntarily became hostages of 
Edward III in order to spare their city. The six men were spared death due to the plea of Edward ' s 
pregnant wife Philippa. 
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under a tree someplace, nobody would have said a thing." It's the sense of anonymity 
which his design conveys, its autonomy, its coolness, its silence that has caused all 
the controversy. 
Many years ago as a child Peter Eisenman walked into an Iowa cornfield and 
soon found hitnself lost in the height and rippling expanse of the stalks. The effect 
that this episode had on the young Eisenman was so unsettling evoking such an 
incomparable feeling of loneliness in the architect that he used the experience as a 
basis for the Monument to Europe's Murdered Jews. Eisenman believes that 'the 
experience of walking through the memorial might be something close to what it' 
really like to be alone in some place."39 Speaking to a standing-room only crowd at 
Columbia's Deutsches Haus Eisenman was eager to point out that the memorial itself 
will offer no formal descriptions and will not make any specific reference to Judaism 
or the Nazi atrocities. "I didn't want names," he added. Eisenman is firm in his 
conviction that "The space isn't a graveyard. It should be absent of meaning." The 
memorial, commissioned by the German government and entitled "Forest of Pillars,' 
will feature some 2, 700 stone pillars of varying height spread over an uneven, sunken 
field measuring nearly 11 acres. The field will be accessible from all four sides, not 
possessing any official entrance or point of destination. Pathways will only be wide 
enough for one person to walk at a time. An underground visitor's center will be 
constructed featuring exhibition rooms and an information center. But above groW1d, 
to preserve the absence of context, the blank stones and distorted walking paths are 
all that will be available to visitors. 
39 Jason Hollander, Columbia Ne11s, "Peter Eisenman, Architecture '60, Designs New Holocaust 
Memorial in Berlin," (1 0 July 2003) 
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Once the design was settled upon the controversy did not abate rather it took a 
sharp turn. In order raise much needed funding for the project Lea Rosh embarked on 
a shocking ad campaign that was intended to "shake up the indifferent and motivate 
the hesitant."40 In July 2001 there appeared billboards, television advertisements, and 
the mailing of half a million free postcards with the following content: printed atop a 
serene picture of a mountain lake and snow-capped mountains are emblazed the 
words "den holocaust hat es nie gegeben," the Holocaust that never happened. Bold 
words in a country where it is illegal, and punishable with up to five years of jail 
time, to deny that the Holocaust occurred. The much smaller text underneath the 
picture reveals the campaign's real message: "There are still people who make this 
claim. In 20 years there could be even more. Make a donation to the memorial for the 
murdered Jews of Europe."41 Rosh was banking on this shock-value campaign to net 
$2.18 million in donations however after a little less than a tnonth the billboards were 
pulled down. The fundraising would continue with a much milder content: "The 
future requires memory - get involved in the construction of the memorial to the 
murdered Jews of Europe." The Jewish community was heavily divided over the 
campaign and eleven claims were filed that stated the campaign was illegal. 
August 16, 2003 was a momentous day in Berlin. "It's been a long road," 
wrote Lea Rosh, who first proposed the project in 1988, as the first stark charcoal-
gray concrete slab was presented by Peter Eisenman. The first proposed completion 
date was penciled in for January 27, 2004 to coincide with the 59th anniversary of the 
40 
von Dirk Kurbjuweit, "Welches Plakat?' ' Der Spiege/30 (2001). 
41 Ibid. 
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liberation of Auschwitz death camp. However the latest plans call for completion by 
May 8, 2005 sixty years after Nazi Germany's defeat in WWII. 
The project, now under way after more than a decade of planning is still not 
exempt from controversy. The latest problem is with Degussa a German chemical 
company that is to coat the memorial with anti-graffiti material. In October 2003 
production was brought to a standstill while organizers tried to reconcile the idea that 
Degussa, who had supplied the poisonous gas Zyklon B to the Nazis who then used it 
in their gas chambers during the Holocaust, would be having a part in the memorial. 
Alexander Brebberm, the representative of the Berlin Jewish community told the 
Berliner Morganpost that it would be absurd to restrict Degussa's participation 
because of the company's past relations with the Nazis . Utz-Helhnuth Felcht Chief 
Officer at Degussa, said that they were honored to be asked to contribute to thi 
memory-work. 42 
The new projected completion date for the memorial is May 8 2005, ixty 
years after the end of WWII. Ironically enough sixty years after the Holocaust, as we 
are approaching the end of living memory, the Germans tnay now, through this 
memorial, have just begun their active memory. For the issue of the perpetrators and 
victims has been settled. The new, active memory of the Holocaust lies within this 
memorial and perhaps it makes remembrance easier for the Germans when the shared 
memory they have is of their lost Jews. 
42
" Holocau t-Mahnmal: Weiterbau mit Degussa," Berliner Morgenpost, (Nov 14, 2003). 
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Conclusion 
It is not enough to ask whether or not our 
memorials remember the Holocaust, or even 
how they remember it. We should also ask to 
what ends we have remembered. 
-James Young1 
It is difficult to believe that in 2004 Germany has been reunited into one 
nation. When the Berlin Wall was toppled so too were all the previous assumptions of 
the past forty years. With Soviet control gone and East Germans free to express their 
desires the issue over German identity took on a whole new meaning. Sudd nly 
everything was much more complicated. 
Berlin is now rebuilt as the capital of a new Germany and the debate over how 
to commemorate the Holocaust within the new capital is already itself a decade old. 
Part of this debate centers around the fact that the murder of Europe' s Jews was 
directed from Berlin, but there were no killing centers in Germany itself. Unlike the 
concentration camps such as Bergen-Bel sen or Dachau or Sachsenhausen, the 
extermination camps were located some distance away. After WWII there were no 
witnesses, so few people survived who entered the camps that there were few people 
who were left to tell the story of the camps. Alexandra Richie sites that it is precisely 
this reason that the Holocaust has entered German memory as something of a 
figurative rather than a literal experience? It is also why Germans have had a problem 
with their Holocaust memory. As James Young has put it, 
had it not been for the massive, last-ditch evacuations of Jewish 
prisoners from death camps in Poland ... the mass murder might have 
1 Young, Texture of Memory, 15. 
2 Alexandra Richie, Faust 's Metropolis: A Histmy of Berlin , (New York: Carroll & GrafPublisher 
Inc. , 1998), 887. 
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remained a foreign phenomenon altogether. German experience of the 
prisoners' plight in the camps was limited largely to either helping 
Jewish neighbors or watching quietly as they disappeared, guarding 
the camps or being forced by Allied soldiers to march through them 
after liberation. As a result, what we call Holocaust memorials tn 
Germany tend to be highly stylized when remembering Jews. 3 
This can be felt no place better than in West Berlin's existing memorial to the camps. 
Located in the Wittenberg Platz U-Bahn station one sees a sign which looks like a bus 
timetable. There is another nearby. As one comes closer one sees that it is not a 
timetable at all but rather a list of twelve concentration and extermination camps 
headed by the words PLACES OF TERROR THAT WE SHOULD NEVER 
FORGET.4 The signs were erected in 1967 and demonstrated just why so many in 
Berlin feel that a central monument to the Holocaust is needed. 
Attempts to commemorate the Nazi evil in Berlin history have often reflected 
contemporary politics. West Berlin's first tnonument to WWII was created in 1952 at 
the former Plotzensee Prison. It was here that 2,500 Getman nationals were hanged or 
guillotined; the site was dedicated to all victims of Fascism. 5 A bit later a memotial 
was erected at Bendlerblock, where Stauffenberg was shot after the failed 1944 
assassination atte1npt, it was dedicated to German resistance. 6 Though these 
memorials were well intended they seemed to echo the post-war West German 
tendency to focus on the "good" Germans - the 1944 plotters - to the exclusion of 
others. Richie argues that it is right for Germans to have a place to mourn all those 
lost in WWII, however this "community of victims" glosses over the very important 
3 Young, Texture ofMemmy, 53. See also WulfE. Brebeck et al. , Zur Arbeit in Gedenkstiittenfor die 
Opfer des Nationalsozialismus: Ein internationa/er Oberb/ick (Berlin, 1988). 
4 The sign reads, Orte des Schreckens, die wir niemals vergessen diirfen. 
5 Richie, 8 84. 
6 Ibid., 884. In 1989 this memorial was expanded to include all members of resistance including that 
mounted by conservatives, liberals, socialists, and communists, Christians and Jews. 
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aspect of the Nazi regime. These memorials imply that a young man who was forced 
into the army against his will and then died on the front can be compared to a young 
man killed in Auschwitz. There is a difference between those that were victims of the 
"horrors of war" and those who were specifically targeted, hunted and murdered not 
just by the Nazis but by the Germans themselves. 7 
The Nazi past is never far from the surface in Germany. Berlin was the center 
of the Third Reich. Here the worst crimes ever committed by Germans were 
discussed, ordered, codified, registered, and approved. 8 The rebuilding of Berlin as 
the capital of the new Germany has brought the evidence of Nazism to the forefront. 
Reminders of Hitler are everywhere: in the tunnels which planners must take into 
account when developing new buildings; in the segments of Goebbels's Propaganda 
Ministry; in a war-time bomb which exploded in a construction site on Septetnber 15 
1994 killing three people; the retnains of Goebbels's bunker and Hitler's Chancellery 
bunker have been exposed: and construction workers frequently come across 
skeletons of those who died in the Battle ofBerlin.9 
The big question which has been at the center of this work all along is 
Germanys search for a usable memory of the Holocaust. And in finding this memory 
Germans have also found their identity. A proud German national identity will one 
day emerge again it may take ten years or forty but it will emerge. What the Getmans 
need to ensure is that it does not ever again take on the destructive nature it once did. 
As Richard von Weizsacker put it, young Germans "are not responsible for what 
happened over forty years ago. But they are responsible for the historical 
7 Ibid., 885. 
8 Ibid. , 885. 
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consequences ... We must help younger people to understand why it is vital to keep 
memories alive." 10 
Berlin cannot build an identity out of nothing. That has been tried with 
disastrous results. Identity can be influenced by politicians historians and architects 
but it cannot be created by them. Identity, just like memory, is fluid and the product 
of a thousand factors. Any attempt to tear down and rebuild over the bedrock of mass 
murder doesn't work and speaks of totalitarianism, and Stunde Null. Germans must 
work with what they have this includes their legacy of crime. 
Berlin was the center of the Third Reich but it has also been the center of a 
great deal more. Rather than dismissing their entire past because of what transpired 
between 1933 and 1945 Berliners should embrace their history and learn from it. 
Richie states that for the first time in decades Berliners are in a position to choose 
which values they wish to emulate. 11 A clear view of history will help in that 
endeavor. The clock can never be turned back or the lives taken by the Nazi Regime 
replaced, but something good can come of it. More than anywhere else in the world 
Berlin can contribute to an understanding of the Holocaust by exposing the insidious 
nature of evil. "Berliners should not try to draw a Schlussstrich, a line under the past, 
or repress it, or turn it into a mere tool of contemporary party politics, or counter it 
with proof of the terrible crimes committed by other dictators." 12 In the end, only the 
victims can forgive the perpetrators. The only thing Germans can do is to try and 
9 Frankfurther Allgemeine Zeitung, (September 17, 1994). 
10 Department of State, Documents on Germany, pp. 1403-10. See also Dennis L. Bark and David R. 
Gress, A History of West Germany (Oxford, 1993) vol. 2: Democracy and Its Discontents 1963-1991 
p . 430. 
11 Richie, 890. 
12 Ibid. , 889. 
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remain worthy of forgiveness by remembering the past and try to build a society in 
which something like the Holocaust will never be allowed to happen again. 
The actual memorial is the controversy around the memorial. 13 Active 
memory is now accepted as part of the German identity. The sixty years it took to 
work the memory out in order for it to be articulated is what makes Germany unique. 
Germans have now proclaimed that they will engage with the memory of the 
Holocaust for as long as it takes. They have now accepted the responsibility to 
remember more than anyone else. One hopes that the new Berlin and the new 
Germany as a whole will choose to live by Voltaire's dictum, "we owe respect to the 
living; to the dead only truth." 14 
13 Sven Kellerhoff, "Uberzogene Erwartungen," Berliner Morgenpost (January 27, 2003) 
14 Voltaire, Oeuvres vol.I: Premiere Lettre sur Oedipe (Paris, 1785), 15n, quoted in Richie 891. 
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